PILGRIMAGE
Christian and Secular
In A Phenomenological Approach

Joshua Haojun Yuan

聖若瑟大學
UNIVERSITY OF
SAINT JOSEPH

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Author
Joshua Haojun Yuan

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Preface

One of the privileges of working with very bright students is watching them seize a concept and run with it: run hard. When Joshua Yuan asked me to work with him and supervise the writing of this book, I was more than a little surprised. We hardly knew one another and I am a theologian and an historian not a philosopher. Insofar as I am familiar with philosophy, it is with the ancients and especially with Aristotle read through St Thomas Aquinas. I confess to having been turned off by Kant and before I started to work with Joshua, Husserl was a closed book to me. Joshua was to change all that.

There is something of a cottage-industry in misappropriating names from religious discourse and applying them to non-religious subjects. Joshua's project seemed to offer an interesting approach to showing that, with regard to pilgrimage at least, it was possible to show that there was something not merely distinct but essentially distinct about religious pilgrimage when set against its touristic and hedonistic comparatives. In this book he argues successfully that the difference lies in intentionality and that Josef Pieper's concept of being at leisure holds the key to that intentionality. What is more, he does so without sacrificing the essential on the altar of the existential, thereby avoiding one of the major pitfalls of phenomenology.

Stephen Morgan

Macao, 8 June 2021

Acknowledgments

My thanks, firstly, go to my parents who have always given me the opportunity to choose what I desire to pursue. Writing this book is, completely, my desire.

I am most indebted to the supervision and companionship of my Master's degree and now PhD supervisor, the Rev. Prof. Stephen Morgan. His invaluable advice and tireless effort drew out of me much energy to drive me to the completion of this book.

It would not have been possible to finish this text without the support of Fr. Domingos Un. It was under Fr. Un's mentorship, that I was inspired to embark on this project. I would also like to thank my colleagues, Angelo and Bosco for help in completing my assigned tasks at work during the writing of this book.

My heartfelt gratitude to Prof. Franz Gassner, Prof. Roberto Ceolin, Prof. Edmond Eh, and Prof. Ian Alabanza for the diverse and illuminating lectures on Philosophy during my Master in Philosophy.

I would also like to thank Fr. Lionel Goh, who has mentored me to become a 'pilgrimage animator' in the Holy Land, and Mr. Stanislaus Lee who has taught me the knowledge of the Holy Land. The primary data of this dissertation would not have become available if it was not because of their generous efforts in introducing me to pilgrimage.

Finally, it would not have been possible to fulfill my desire of completing this work without the Grace of God. It is by His Grace, I am able to have a vision of Him where the true, the good, and the beautiful are found.

Introduction

Imagine that there are two different groups of people going to Jerusalem, one is formed of a Christian community, the other is composed of tourists gathered together through a commercial travel agency. Both groups might prepare themselves in anticipation of the coming journey but might have different expectations. They might visit similar sites in Jerusalem; they experience aspects of the three monotheistic religions. After the journey concludes, they might receive the experience of having received something: a sense of happiness, perhaps? But given the fact that the groups will have different motivations, different preparations, different intentions in making the journey, and two different experiences of the same destination, both journeys can properly be called a 'pilgrimage', and given that it is reasonable to assume that some element of their purpose in making the journey is pleasure, what are the two different sets of 'happiness' involved?

Another example of a touristic experience might be that of a Chelsea football fan who takes a long journey from his homeland to England to visit the stadium of Stamford Bridge. When he enters the stadium, the football field before him is that on which Frank Lampard, one of the legendary players in the Chelsea football team, has played and scored. He can never capture this visionary experience unless physically being there. Moreover, later on his tour, there is a ravishing moment when he sees the shirt of Lampard, in a display case in the exhibition room. His immediate reaction might be that of taking a photo for the sake of capturing this moment. After this trip, whenever he looks at this photo, he will remember what a splendid experience he had at Stamford Bridge. Can this entire experience, too, be understood as a pilgrimage?

These three different experiences might indeed be considered as experiences of pilgrimage. Given that pilgrimage is a journey to a place at which pilgrims can undergo an experience or seek some meaning, a football fan who goes to England to visit Stamford Bridge stadium could be regarded as a pilgrimage, the group organized by a travel agency might also be so, in both cases quite as much as the traditional group of Christian believers going on what they intentionally conceive of as a pilgrimage.

Peter Margry makes an analogy between whiskey and pilgrimage.[1] He suggests that the alcohol in whiskey is analogous to the religious motivation in pilgrimage, and, therefore, by extension, secular pilgrimage might be seen as an alcohol-free whiskey, leaving the question of whether we can still speak of it as whiskey, and, can we still speak of it as pilgrimage when a religious motivation is absent? Hence, who can justify whether these journeys are pilgrimages? If it is not properly to be called a pilgrimage, is it because the journeys lack religious devotion? If it can, what then are the commonalities with traditional pilgrimage?

This short work will not provide any new definition of pilgrimage or justify epistemologically whether one is 'really' going on a pilgrimage. Instead, firstly this book will examine the definitions of pilgrimage under the aspects of religion, anthropology, sociology, and Christian Patristic understanding. From these forerunners in research, the different aspects of pilgrimage will be subjected to a phenomenological analysis.

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[1] Peter Jan Margry, "Whiskey and Pilgrimage: Clearing Up Commonalities," *Tourism Recreation Research* 2, no. 39 (2014): 243.

Next, it is important to the argument of this present work to describe and categorize the various phenomena of religious pilgrimage. Secondly, this chapter reviews the understanding of religious pilgrimage in Christianity from biblical sources and from Christian Patristic documents. By the use of the phenomenological process of 'epoché', 'disinteresting' the common understanding of traditional Christian pilgrimage, it then studies the phenomenology-proper of pilgrimage. This part is the trunk of this chapter. It intends to find out the identity of a Christian pilgrimage by which we clarify the commonalities and differences between a Christian pilgrimage and a secular pilgrimage.

Last, from the analysis of phenomenology, the distinction between Christian and secular pilgrimages is further evaluated. It is the thesis of this book that what pilgrims look for during a Christian pilgrimage is happiness, which is understood as eudaimonia, or in the terminology of Thomas Aquinas, beatitudo; and that this is the factor distinguishing a Christian from a secular pilgrimage. Furthermore, I argue that contemplation is the activity that, most likely, enables Christian pilgrims to know happiness. Last but not least, I contend that 'being at leisure' (in the terminology of Josef Pieper) is a primary element of and an essential precondition for pilgrims achieving the vision of happiness.

Methodology

If the experience of visiting the stadium of Stamford Bridge is parallel to the traditional pilgrimage, how should we understand both pilgrimages? An analysis of pilgrimage itself derived from sociology, etymology or other approaches risks being incomplete and leaving conceptual loose ends dangling when it comes to distinguishing between these two kinds of pilgrimages. This book will make use of phenomenology as the methodology to reveal and uncover those characteristics linking pilgrimage with pilgrims' consciousness. By means of phenomenological analysis, the connection between pilgrimages and the experiences of pilgrims enables us to describe closely the various phenomena of pilgrimages rather than only an abstraction and attempts at defining the concept of pilgrimage separate from the experience of it. from the experience of it.

The possibility of the transcendental viewpoint has been located by other phenomenologists as the key question in developments of phenomenology and they are specifically seen in Husserl's legacy: transcendental phenomenology. The notion of Husserl's transcendental phenomenology is based on his critique of Kant's transcendental philosophy. Husserl established the possibility of a transcendental inquiry into the conditions of possibility of individuals' experiences of the world and things within the world. Husserl characterized his method of access to the inquiry of individuals' experiences by transcendental reduction which differs from Kant's transcendental deduction. The exploration of the methodology used here will mainly refer to

Husserlian transcendental phenomenology, specifically to the method of reduction.[2] For a detailed elucidation of the concept of phenomenology, the explanations by Sokolowski and Moran will be applied.[3] Furthermore, Van Manen provides an extensive exploration of applying the phenomenological method on the examination of pilgrimage which will also be drawn upon. In order that this is possible, it is first necessary, to elucidate some of the key concepts in phenomenology: namely, intentionality, *natural and phenomenological attitudes, epoché and transcendental reduction.*

First, phenomenology details with every act because when a human person perceives an object in the world, he or she has a consciousness of that object.[4] Edmund Husserl borrows the critical insight of 'intentionality' from Franz Brentano.[5] He uses this term to mean having a consciousness of something. By way of example, when one goes to an archaeological site, one may say, "I see an archaeological fact," or "I imagine the scene back to the time of its beginning," or "I only see a ruin there." How can one thing be understood in various ways? Van Manen would answer that the things around us present themselves partially (as opposed to fully, in all their aspects and properties) and, furthermore, that our experience of those things is always as it appears to us.[6] For Sokolowski, a thing does not just exist there, it appears itself as what it

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[2] To know Husserl's fundamental works of Phenomenology, see Edmund Husserl, *Ideas: A General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology,* trans. W. R. Boyce Gibson (London: Allen & Unwin, 1931); Edmund Husserl, *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy*, ed. David Carr, 6th pr, Studies in Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1984).

[3] Robert Sokolowski, *Introduction to Phenomenology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Dermot Moran, *Edmund Husserl: Founder of Phenomenology*, Key Contemporary Thinkers (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005); Max Van Manen, *Phenomenology of Practice: Meaning-Giving Methods in Phenomenological Research and Writing*, Developing Qualitative Inquiry, vol. 13 (Walnut Creek, CA: Left Coast Press, 2014).

[4] Sokolowski, *Introduction to Phenomenology*, 8–9.

[5] Moran, *Edmund Husserl*, 5.

[6] Van Manen, *Phenomenology of Practice*, 62.

is, of which appearance is a part of the being of that thing.[7] The different perceptions of different people of the archaeological site are, nonetheless, 'true' despite their difference, because those different individuals bring different intentionalities to their act of perception. This idea of intentionality depends upon the claim that only the experience of the act of consciousness is indubitable. In the example of an archaeological site, the experiences of people see the site variously as a ruin, or as an archaeological fact, or even seeing the stones merely as stones is also indubitable. The notion of intentionality reveals the consciousness always as a consciousness of something, that is linked with the external world rather than locked inside the mind. In this approach, a self is the place where things disclose themselves.[8]

Hence, phenomenology arouses the value of first-person experience,[9] "I have a consciousness of going on a journey as a pilgrimage" becomes a basic form of intentionality in the experience of the pilgrimage itself. Every phenomenological investigation begins with this basic form. To analyze a pilgrim's intentionality is not to analyze the motivation or intention of going on a pilgrimage. Instead, phenomenology begins with the fact of intentionality and proceeds to examine how pilgrims have a consciousness of a journey as a pilgrimage and not just a tour. Furthermore, intentionality is differentiated from the object of that intentionality.[10] As we examine the experiences of pilgrims, we begin to discover different intentionalities which pertain to different types of conscious acts (perceiving, remembering, and anticipating) made by the pilgrims themselves.

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[7] Sokolowski, *Introduction to Phenomenology*, 14

[8] Sokolowski, *Introduction to Phenomenology*, 65; Van Manen, *Phenomenology of Practice*, 63.

[9] David Woodruff Smith, "Phenomenology," in *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Summer 2018 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta, accessed January 15, 2020, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2018/entries/phenomenology/.

[10] Sokolowski, *Introduction to Phenomenology*, 12.

Second, the phenomenological approach requires that the notion of 'natural' attitude and 'phenomenological' or 'transcendental' attitude are distinguished from one another.[11] The natural attitude concerns what one can perceive directly from the world and that perception becomes one's 'general belief.'[12] In the natural attitude we experience the world as being there, as true, as real. We accept what we have simply experienced in the world, which acceptance of that experience becomes one's belief, or, to use the Greek term, doxa.[13] All other phenomenological reflection may arise within or founded on the doxa, or, one's general beliefs. Husserl calls this attitude 'naïve' because we are normally unaware of its own identity within the natural attitude. As we become aware of different aspects of this 'true' or 'real' world that we encounter, we doxastically alter our perception of it. In other words, we gradually realize that things in the world are not as first they seem. Thus, we need to turn, to think and to contemplate on our beliefs concerning these objects of our perception. Phenomenology, however, does not agree that the truth of the world is internal, contained simply within our minds, but rather "it looks at human beings as the place in the world where truth occurs."[14] Husserl builds up a new bridge between subject and the world by the concept of intentionality, which, taken together, both invoke the idea of a whole.[15] It is not that the understanding of a thing derived from the natural attitude is wrong but that a phenomenological approach allows us to put it aside (bracketing, *epoche*), in order to contemplate and reflect upon the object of our

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[11] Moran, *Edmund Husserl,* 7; Sokolowski, *Introduction to Phenomenology,* 42.

[12] Moran, *Edmund Husserl,* 55.

[13] The root of the word is *dok*, from which the verb *dokeo*, meaning to have an action of the mind what epistemologists call a doxastic process, *doke*—a vision—and *doxa*—an opinion—, and by extension a good opinion. To see the various entries for words derived from the root *dok* in *A Greek-English Lexicon* by Liddell and Scott, pp. 327b−330a.

[14] Sokolowski, *Introduction to Phenomenology,* 65.

[15] Ibid., 46.

concern. In this way we achieve a more in-depth understanding of the phenomenon itself and, in the present case.

By definition, a religious pilgrimage is a journey: to visit sacred sites out of a religious requirement or a devotion, in search of a deepened spirituality or to allow oneself to engage in inner reflections on life and the world.[16] These are common beliefs concerning religious pilgrimage in the natural attitude. However, as Collins-Kreiner, amongst others shows, in our contemporary interpretation, 'pilgrimage' itself exists as a type of traveling experience in a manner which differs from these set of beliefs attached to this notion of the natural attitude. Contemporary pilgrimage might have been identified as firstly, individuals going on journeys to traditional sacred sites without religious devotion but "pilgrimages are products of the culture in which they were created,"[17] such that journeys which would not have been considered as traditional pilgrimages in that natural attitude come to be seen as such even when both the travelers and the destinations in the pilgrimages are entirely secular, such as the experience of Stamford Bridge we encountered earlier. This wider notion of what constitutes pilgrimage under the contemporary interpretation is also the starting point for future phenomenological investigations. This book engages with these beliefs in the natural attitude and, by a process of phenomenological reflection, finds that, even though, reductively, both religious and contemporary pilgrimages seem to be simply as an individual or a

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[16] Tim Gale, Avril Maddrell, and Alan Terry, "Introducing Sacred Mobilities: Journeys of Belief and Belonging," in *Sacred Mobilities: Journeys of Belief and Belonging*, ed. Avril Maddrell, Alan Terry, and Tim Gale (London: Routledge, 2018), 3.

[17] Noga Collins-Kreiner, "Geographers and Pilgrimages: Changing Concepts in Pilgrimage Tourism Research," *Tijdschrift Voor Economische En Sociale Geografie* 101, no. 4 (September 2010): 445, accessed February 10, 2020, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9663.2009.00561.x.

group of people going on a journey to a destination from which they might seek out some meaning, there is a fundamental difference between the two when we move from the 'natural' to the 'phenomenological' attitude.

The phenomenological attitude comes to the scene, after transitions from the natural attitude. It aims to contemplate the different intentionalities of an experience of the world, in our present case of pilgrimage. In this attitude, we assume the viewpoint of 'epoché', which in Greek means, to be a sceptic or to doubt, with respect to the general beliefs of the world. Husserl uses this word to mean 'suspending' or 'bracketing'. The purpose of *epoché* is to open oneself to the experience as lived. We 'bracket' them, that is to say, we are not restricted to the subjective side of consciousness and the objective appearances, rather, we focus on how the pure 'self-givenness' of an object appears to us. If the object appears itself an anticipated object, we examine it as anticipated; if it is a perceived object, we examine it as perceived; if it is a remembered object, we examine it as remembered. In the same way, this book will examine the experience of pilgrimage as anticipated, as perceived, and as remembered. This *epoché* is a necessary interstice between the natural and the phenomenological attitude, which frees us from reading into the latter a *priori* assumptions or a *posteriori* conclusion. This *epoché* provides the necessary space between the two attitudes and thereby enables a proper phenomenological reduction.

After the necessary *epoché*, we turn to the phenomenological attitude. This turn is called 'phenomenological reduction' or 'transcendental reduction' and is a 'neutralization' of a phenomenon from the imposed

beliefs and presuppositions within the natural attitude.[18] This 'neutralization' by using the method of phenomenological reduction, allows us to move away from the natural attitude, so that what is left is the "pure consciousness in its absolute being,"[19] providing the possibility of transcendental understanding. Furthermore, reduction brings us to the "shore of phenomenology" that is the domain of self-givenness.[20] In phenomenological reduction, transcendental reduction is taken to mean the process of reduction by which we are able to uncover hidden meanings. The word transcendental is used in phenomenology in a manner distinct from and which should not be identified with the understanding of transcendental as applied in Medieval philosophy.[21] In the first place, the former (phenomenological sense) uses it as an adjective: in the latter it is a noun. However, both signify something that one cannot attain by mere sensory powers: both are hidden. They are hidden because we cannot see them unless we transcend or go beyond our daily experiences: that is beyond our consciousness of things.[22]

Phenomenological researchers agree that human beings have both empirical and transcendental egos, in the one entity.[23] The empirical ego enables us to be involved in the world: the transcendental ego is the agent in which the truth of the world manifests and discloses itself. Both egos function differently and separately but simultaneously. As noted above, Husserl characterizes the former one as naïve, one which calls for a completion in

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[18] Sokolowski, *Introduction to Phenomenology*, 49, 58.

[19] Moran, *Edmund Husserl,* 188.

[20] Ibid., 7–8.

[21] To know more about the definition of transcendentals in Medieval Philosophy, see Daniel J. Sullivan, *An Introduction to Philosophy: Perennial Principles of the Classical Tradition* (Ashland, OR: Tan books, 1957), 206−16.

[22] Van Manen, *Phenomenology of Practice*, 90.

[23] Sokolowski, *Introduction to Phenomenology,* 112.

contemplation by the transcendental ego: transcendental knowledge validates the naïve.

When it comes to considering a pilgrims' physical experience, for instance, one might say that the expressions "I go on a pilgrimage" and "I visit sacred sites" could be regarded as an expression of naïve intentionalities or acts of consciousness. Whereas by means of a transcendental reduction of these acts, we are led away from the unhidden to contemplate these experiences and uncover the hidden. We transcend the naïve of a particular pilgrimage to consider how such a pilgrimage exists, and thereby come to understand the contexts or meanings of a pilgrim's experience precisely as pilgrimage.

This book seeks to reflect accurately and contemplate how pilgrims anticipate, perceive, and remember pilgrimage by means of this understanding of phenomenological reduction. This practice is relevant to and revealing of the "three formal structures" of the phenomenological method as noted by Sokolowski: the structure of parts and wholes, identity in a manifold, and *presence and absence*.[24] These three formal structures are correlated with one another. Phenomenology distinguishes the identity of the object, which appears among the description of its parts and wholes. Pilgrimage presents itself in various ways, by looking at the different parts and wholes of pilgrimage in order to figure out the identity of pilgrimage in the manifold nature of these parts and wholes. This identity is not given only in the presence of pilgrimage, but sometimes in the absence.[25] Phenomenology clarifies the meaning of the intentionality of presence and

[24] Sokolowski, *Introduction to Phenomenology,* 22.

[25] Ibid., 37.

absence. Pilgrims might intend to see what will itself present at the 'center,'[26] This intention is, however, unfulfilled or empty until the pilgrim arrives at the center. This is the intentionality of absence or empty intention. When pilgrims arrive at the center, this arrival fulfills the absence, and turns it into the sought for presence of the pilgrims' intentionality. By the investigation of the three structures of the various phenomena of different kinds of pilgrimage (religious, touristic and secular), we might acknowledge the different intentionalities of the phenomenon of pilgrimage.

Last, in Van Manen's words, a phenomenological question is to 'wonder' the pre-reflective phenomena in the natural attitude.[27] In phenomenology, reflections pertain to retrospections rather than introspections. They assist us in clarifying the intentionalities which we have achieved from natural attitude, but reflections never replace the natural attitude. In other words, phenomenology complements the natural attitude.[28] The pre-reflective phenomena are 'ready' to be perceived, imagined, interpreted, and in the same way, to other acts of consciousness. During the process of reduction, we start to wonder how a phenomenon occurs as such. 'Wonder' brings one to raise the question of being. Precisely, in considering the phenomenology of pilgrimage, we look at the pilgrims as the 'dative' of the manifestation to whom the beings of pilgrimage are disclosed.[29] Given that a pilgrimage is a journey to attain new knowledge, this present work 'wonders' how pilgrims seek out meanings through their journeys. Specifically, in the case of religious

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[26] See Mircea Eliade *Images and Symbols: Studies in Religious Symbolism*, Mythos (Princeton, NJ:Princeton University Press, 1991), 39. The book suggests that the place in which the sacred manifests itself is called the 'center' of the world, *axis mundi.* More explanations will be given in chapter 1.

[27] Van Manen, *Phenomenology of Practice*, 36–37.

[28] Sokolowski, *Introduction to Phenomenology*, 63.

[29] Ibid., 65.

pilgrimage, it wonders how pilgrims experience the manifestation of the divine and it further wonders how they capture the moment of the manifestation. It also wonders whether all pilgrims succeed in achieving their aims. Finally, it wonders if, given that not all pilgrims can attain their aims, there is an essential element that enables pilgrims to achieve their aims?

This phenomenological approach leads us to consider the proposition that in Christian pilgrimage, the intentionality of 'being at leisure' is the essential element for pilgrims who intend to know what happiness is during their journeys. By having a phenomenological comparison between Christian and secular pilgrimage, this book also argues that seeking out the meaning of happiness makes a Christian pilgrimage differ from other contemporary pilgrimages.

Chapter 1. What is Pilgrimage?

1.1 Etymology

The English word 'pilgrimage' derives from the old French word *peregrinor*. It means being or living abroad, a sojourner, a traveler in foreign places. Also, it pertains to the Latin words *pereger* and *per-agro*, "to wander or travel through or to go through."[30] Therefore, pilgrimage could signify that a group of pilgrims depart from their homeland and go to another place, where they are like foreigners. In a religious sense, the orientation of a pilgrimage is that of going to a holy place. St. Augustine used the Latin term peregrinatio as a metaphor for the Christian life.[31] He implied that one wanders away from the place of home in the earthly life on a journey toward the port of the Infinity of God. This wandering lets us become *pereginini*, foreigners in this world. Speaking of spiritual pilgrimage, it turns people toward what he called the City of God, led by God as the navigator. In the ninth century, Celtic Christians had a similar spiritual tradition expressed in a strikingly physical form. They embarked upon journeys by boats floating by the water and arrived wherever the wind and tides took them.[32] This symbolized that to undertake a *peregrinatio* into the unknown was to be one who leaves everything behind and lets God guide one to wherever He wills.

Pilgrimage is related to the concept underlying the Greek word, *theoria*, which literally means 'look', 'spectacle', and 'view'. In the ancient

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[30] Charlton Thomas Lewis, *A Latin Dictionary: founded on Andrews' edition of Freund's Latin dictionary* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002), *see per-ago & peregrinor,* p. 1333a, 1338b.

[31] Augustine, *The City of God* (New York: Modern Library, 1983), 695–97.

[32] Cintra Pemberton, *Soulfaring: Celtic Pilgrimage Then and Now* (Harrisburg, PA: Morehouse Publishing,1999), 26–27.

Greek period, theoria was also used to express a cultural practice where pilgrims or *theoroi* made a journey abroad from which they can learn something from a place outside their normal place of habitation.[33] In classical Greek, theoros denotes a 'religious delegate' who was appointed to participate in the festivals of other cities. The primary role is one of being a spectator, who watches or observes rituals and offers sacrifices in a sanctuary.[34] The journey, for the sake of participating in the festivals, that is, travelling from one's own city to another city, might reasonably be regarded as a pilgrimage, *theoria*, and the delegates understood as pilgrims, *theoroi*. There is another philosophical form of *theoria*: an activity that involves the contemplation of the views before the eyes of the viewer.[35] In this form, people are understood as making a pilgrimage to a place in order to witness a spectacle: a drama, ritual, and athletic competitionsthis—being the character and activities that marked the festivals of Greek cities. This process of witness of the festival is not simply one of observation but of reflective experience, of contemplation. Aristotle regarded *theoria* in this sense as a leisure activity.[36]

The English word 'parish' comes from the Greek noun *paroikia* or verb *paroikeo*.[37] The Catholic Church uses the word 'parish' to separate the different areas in a diocese. The word 'parish' is used in the biblical

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[33] Andrea Wilson Nightingale, "The Philosopher at the Festival: Plato's Transformation of Traditional *Theōria*," in *Pilgrimage in Graeco-Roman and Early Christian Antiquity: Seeing the Gods,* ed. Jaś Elsner and Ian Rutherford (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 155.

[34] Ian Rutherford, *State Pilgrims and Sacred Observers in Ancient Greece: A Study of Theōriā and Theōroi* (Cambridge, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 5.

[35] Nightingale, "The Philosopher at the Festival," 155.

[36]Aristotle, *The Basic Works of Aristotle*, ed. Richard McKeon, Modern Library Classics (New York: Modern Library, 2001), *Politics*, 1337b. To know more about the interpretation of philosophical *theoria* according to the classical Greek, see Nightingale, "The Philosopher at the Festival," 152−5.

[37] Henry George Liddell and Robert Scott, *A Greek-English Lexicon* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1861), 1096a.

sources. It designates "a community of faith living as a stranger and pilgrim in this world."[38] Peter, the Apostle, told the other Christian believers to live their life as pilgrims, aliens, sojourners (in the Greek of the original written text *paroikois*).[39] Paul reminded the gentile believers in Ephesus that they were not aliens or foreign visitors in the community of faith but fellow-citizens with Jewish Christians in Heaven.[40] Thus, for Catholic Christians, pilgrimage can be understood as a metaphor for the earthly life, as we have seen Augustine claim. Christians are living as pilgrims with the 'parish' understood as a pilgrim church, which is sometimes symbolized in early Christian iconography as a boat carrying pilgrims toward Heaven.

Practicing pilgrimage does not only occur in the Western world, however. In Japan, they use their language to define pilgrimage precisely as closely relating to a religious sense or a spiritual journey. The Shikoku *Junrei* is the most traditional pilgrimage in Japanese Zen Buddhism. *Junrei* means pilgrimage in Japanese: *jun* stands for 'going around', and *rei* means 'worshipping'.[41] Shikoku is one of the five main islands in Japan. In the eighth century, a priest, Kukai who was born in Shikoku initially spread Buddhism throughout Japan. This pilgrimage to his birthplace, however, was not established until the twelfth-century when people started to walk on the path said to have been Kukai's, on Shikoku Island.

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[38] William J. Rademacher, John S. Weber, and David McNeill, *Understanding Today's Catholic Parish* (New London, CT: Twenty-Third Publications, 2007), 7.

[39] 1 Peter 1:17. 2:11.

[40] Fédéric Manns, "世上的僑民及旅客：厄彼翁派的淵源 Étranger et Pèlerin En Ce Monde Ou Les Racines de l'ébionisme," *Studium Biblicum OFM HK Annual* 2007 (2006): 6.

[41] Ian Reader, *Pilgrimage: A Very Short Introduction* (London: Oxford University Press, 2015), 21.

The meaning of *junrei* contains two further traditionally understood elements: going around to several sacred places and practicing austerity.[42] Eiki et al. further claim that the meaning of austerity in this context is that of an ascetic reflection.[43] Thus, while pilgrims are wandering ascetically, they are having a spiritual retrospection of themselves, which retrospection becomes the focal point of *junrei*. Worshipping, '*rei*', makes the journey become 'holy' because the nature of Shikoku pilgrimage is integral with traveling to places and worshipping in the temples.[44] In Japanese, therefore, the concept of pilgrimage is highly related to the aspects of religiosity and spirituality.

In Hinduism, people also practice pilgrimage. The practice of *Tirtha -yatra* refers to pilgrimage in Hinduism. *Tirtha* in Sanskrit literally means 'crossing places', and spiritually 'one that purifies': *yatra* refers to 'journey'.[45] Moreover, the term indicates a journey to the places where there is the intersection between the sacred and the profane.[46] Pilgrimage is considered as a journey to have an encounter with the gods by which one will receive meaning, liberation, and benefit in the spiritual life. Also, the term *tirtha*, 'crossing places', symbolizes a place from which pilgrims have a transmigration from the life-cycle of reincarnation (birth and rebirth) towards attaining *moksha* (salvation).[47] Therefore, pilgrimage in Hindu culture also has a deep religious sense. It acts as a mediating experience whereby one

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[42] Hoshino Eiki, Ian Reader, and 星野 (tieng nhat), "Pilgrimage and Peregrination: Contextualizing the Saikoku Junrei and the Shikoku Henro," *Japanese Journal of Religious Studies* 24, no. 3/4 (1997): 277.

[43] Ibid., 278.

[44] Reader, *Pilgrimage*, 23.

[45] Krishan Sharma, Anil Kishore Sinha, and B. G. Banerjee, *Anthropological Dimensions of Pilgrimage* (New Delhi: Paragon Books, 2009), 2.

[46] Reader, *Pilgrimage*, 22.

[47] Sharma, Sinha, and Banerjee, *Anthropological Dimensions of Pilgrimage*, 3.

can have a spiritual journey by undertaking a physical journey, that is by walking over holy places. In this Hindu understanding, it is the journey rather than the destination, that is the mediating experience of the divine.

Hence, from the etymological point of view, pilgrimage, the Latin, *peregrinatio* means going out to a foreign land. Christianity has used this term referring to the Christian life that one lives as an alien, a sojourner, a pilgrim in this world, aiming for the eternal world. In Japanese and Hindu cultures, pilgrimages become journeys for beseeching the favor of the gods and for spiritual reflection.

Going to religious sites, however, has also become a not uncommon activity of those who are not believers or whose journey lacks an explicit religious motivation but who travel to religious places. For example, Compostela in Spain, is one of the popular destinations in contemporary 'pilgrimage'.[48] We may, therefore, reasonably ask: is a journey regarded as a pilgrimage even without an explicit religious motivation? On the other hand, epistemologically, how does one know if he or she is making a religious pilgrimage or secular pilgrimage? In order to answer these questions, we need to consider how people perceive a journey to religious sites, when such a journey is not inspired by conscious religious motivation.

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[48] Rubén C. Lois-González and Xosé M. Santos, "Tourists and Pilgrims on Their Way to Santiago. Motives, Caminos and Final Destinations," *Journal of Tourism and Cultural Change* 13, no. 2 (2015): 149–64, accessed February 16, 2020, https://doi.org/10.1080/14766825.2014.918985.

1.2 Definition and Literature Reviews on Pilgrimage

Peter Margry concludes that "pilgrimage is inherently religious/spiritual activity"[49] and, as already noted, he makes the analogy of the difference between pilgrimage and tourism as like that between whiskey and alcohol-free whiskey. This analogy indicates that there are many commonalities between pilgrimage and tourism, and these commonalities might be seen as 'demoting' the notion of pilgrimage from a religious activity to a secular and recreational activity—however, the element of religion distinguishes pilgrimage from tourism in Margry's analogy, as does alcohol in distinguishing whiskey from some other beverage. Thus, if the analogy holds, alcohol-free whiskey is not the same as whiskey, and so perhaps, religiosity is the distinctive element of pilgrimage. The question, therefore, that needs to be answered is that of whether religiosity (or the intentionality of it) is a part of the essence of pilgrimage?

It is, however, not sufficient to see pilgrimage merely from the word itself. As the use of the term itself in contemporary scholarly literature shows, the notion of pilgrimage is changing.[50] When we describe pilgrimage in a broader way, there might be various elements or phenomena in a pilgrimage common to both those journeys traditionally understood as pilgrimages and those that might not have been so: pilgrims make a journey from one place (usually their homeland) to another place; pilgrims achieve and experience new things during the journey; pilgrims will reminisce about the experience of pilgrimage after it concluded. Do these apodictic descriptions expand the meaning of pilgrimage in such a way as to so

[49] Margry, "Whiskey and Pilgrimage: Clearing Up Commonalities," 243.

[50] See n. 48, above.

universalize the term as to make it meaningless or so detach it from the sense of religion from which it originates so as similarly to hollow it out or strip it of usefulness in describing a distinct type of journey? Before undertaking a phenomenological investigation of pilgrimage, with the intention of resolving these questions, it is useful to consider the perspectives of the former scholars who have examined the notion from different angles.

Erik Cohen quotes Mircea Eliade,[51] who proposed that there was a dichotomy between the sacred and the profane use of the term 'pilgrimage' by associating it with the manifestation of the arena, when he remarks, "The quest for the mythical land of pristine existence, of no evil or suffering, the primeval center from which man originally emerged."[52] Eliade claimed that the definition of primitive pilgrimage was one in which man would embark on a journey from his place to the center of sacredness, which is the axis mundi, the center of the world.[53] The motivation, precisely, is looking for eternal happiness, which is located in this center. This center is associated with the manifestation of the divine (i.e., a theophany), which is beyond one's empirical world, a world that is full of chaos. This mobility of man in this primitive understanding of pilgrimage as seeking of eternal happiness is presented, in Eliade's understanding as understood by Cohen, as motivated by a mythological legend. The encounter with the divine occurs on arrival at the center; this is the place where men find refuge in their flight from the complexity of pleasure and pain amidst the order and chaos common in their normal lives. Moreover, it is the theophany, the

[51] Mircea Eliade, *The Sacred and the Profane: The Nature of Religion; the Groundbreaking Work by One of the Greatest Authorities on Myth, Symbol, and Ritual,* A Harvest Book (San Diego: Harcourt, 1987).

[52] Erik Cohen, "A Phenomenology of Tourist Experiences," *Sociology* 13, no. 2 (May 1979): 182, accessed 3 February, 2020, https://doi.org/10.1177/003803857901300203.

[53] Eliade, *The Sacred and the Profane*, 36–37.

manifestation of the divine, that makes a place become sacred. Hence, this place becomes the center of pilgrimage where primitive pilgrims go. The liminal point between sacred and profane is located at the center.

After presenting what primitive pilgrimage is in Eliade's understanding, Erik Cohen next states that, "the traditional pilgrimage differs from the archaic pilgrimage."[54] Both are different because the center of traditional pilgrimage is located within the 'world'. The 'world', Eliade further explains, refers to the sacred place where the sacredness exists because "the theophany that occurs in a place consecrates it" and the sacredness is erected in and out of a profane territory.[55] Later, it becomes a place at which the people, who witness the manifestation of the sacred, set it up as an object which becomes the pilgrimage center. This manifestation of the divine – that is of the erection of the location at which a theophany had taken place – is what Eliade called 'hierophany'. Hierophany, etymologically, means something sacred that shows itself to us.[56] Additionally, John D. Dadosky, who observes religious experiences by comparing the treatment given to them by Eliade and Bernard Lonergan, remarks that "hierophanies can be associated with an experience of the divine, which in turn renders sacred an object, place, or ritual."[57] The difference between theophany and hierophany, therefore, can be seen as what distinguishes the primitive from the traditional pilgrimage.

Further, we have seen that practicing rituals and worship becomes the activities of pilgrims in traditional pilgrimage at the center, whereas

[54] Cohen, "A Phenomenology of Tourist Experiences," 182.

[55] Eliade, *The Sacred and the Profane*, 26.

[56] Ibid., 11.

[57] John Daniel Dadosky, *The Structure of Religious Knowing: Encountering the Sacred in Eliade and Lonergan* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2004), 32.

those activities and the purposes related to them are inaccessible in their homeland. Through these activities—journey, ritual, worship—the pilgrim is freed from daily restrictions and goes to the center, where the opportunity exists that one can encounter the divine. The center of traditional pilgrimage is located at the place of hierophany, for example, Jerusalem becomes the center of the Jewish and Christian pilgrimage, as does Mecca for the Muslim.[58] Therefore, in traditional pilgrimage, pilgrims going on a pilgrimage aim to arrive at the center, within which the sacred object of their journey is located.

Another aspect of pilgrimage is that of a process of self-realization by purification, for, as Maddrell et al. argue, pilgrimage is identified as an inner journey of contemplation and reflection.[59] People might go on a pilgrimage in order to satisfy a spiritual need. Even though this perspective derives historically from the practice of late-medieval Christian pilgrimage, in which an individual or a group, after being condemned for a crime of violence under the then predominant Christian penitential system, were expelled from their home place with the requirement that they travel to a particular destination where they can obtain spiritual purification. The term can still, until today, relate to those who go on a pilgrimage without any religious cause and seek to acquire spiritual healing or benefit.[60] In this understanding of pilgrimage, the feeling of the need to undertake penance is what causes pilgrimage to happen. The moments of going on a pilgrimage seem here to be understood as a process of purification. Given that the historical system of penance, as described above, no longer subsists,

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[58] Indeed, Jerusalem is also a center, albeit a secondary one, for Muslims.

[59] Gale, Maddrell, and Terry, "Introducing Sacred Mobilities," 3.

[60] Margry, "Whiskey and Pilgrimage: Clearing Up Commonalities," 243.

the question arises as to why do people feel the need of purification, and the feeling of having undertaken some form of penance?

Instead of discussing the meaning of purification and penance as distinct from each other, for these purposes, we can treat them as multiple, complex, interacting feelings.[61] There are difficulties and challenges while going on a pilgrimage, and these burdens might be endured to deliver a representation or prefiguration of the difficulties and challenges of ordinary life. At these moments, the pilgrim is enabled to undertake a period of retrospection and reflect upon his past. Thus, this process may lead to a feeling of penance that enables the pilgrim to recover or rediscover some aspects of the meaning of life. As the first document from the *Pontifical Council for the Pastoral Care of Migrants and Itinerant People*, published by the Roman Catholic Church, notes, "pilgrimages in the desert or towards a holy place became the symbol of another pilgrimage, the interior one."[62] Through this interior pilgrimage, by digging into the deeper self, one may find the meaning of life and be aware of one's own limitations. While immersing oneself into this self-realization, the pilgrimage is led from being a physical one to a spiritual one, and the holy place as a destination becomes to be seen as the soul itself of the pilgrim. This concept of pilgrimage as a symbol of the life-journey was once understood well very early in Christianity.[63]

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[61] David Crouch, "Feelings of the Sacred and Their Occurrence in Journeys," in *Sacred Mobilities Journeys of Belief and Belonging*, ed. Avril Maddrell, Alan Terry, and Tim Gale (London; New York: Routledge, 2018), 42.

[62] Pontifical Council for the Pastoral Care of Migrants and Itinerant People, "The Pilgrimage in the Great Jubilee," April 11, 1998, accessed March 10, 2020,http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/pontifical_councils/migrants/documents/rc_pc_migrants_doc_19980425_pilgrimage_en.htm#Christian.

[63] See 1 Peter 1:1,17; 2:11, Phil 3:20. Among these passages, Peter and Paul called the other Christian members as *sojourners or travelers in this world,* that is to say, they gave them an exhortation explaining that human life in this world is a pilgrimage, and Christian should not be attached to material things in this world, because they should aim for Heaven.

This interior aspect of pilgrimage can be seen as a parallel to the concept of catharsis found in Aristotle's *Poetics*.[64] The Greek word catharsis can mean, amongst other things, purgation or purification. In Aristotle's conception, the feeling of catharsis happened when one watched the dramatic tragedies that were central in the rituals the theoroi were sent to witness: the observers, the individual *theoroi* as they experienced the tragedy, delved into the tragedy, delved into their negative emotions, and becoming involved in the scene of a dramatic tragedy, which might have some similarity to what had happened in their life, resolved those negative emotions. Aristotle's notion of dramatic catharsis is controversial, admitting at least two theories of how it operates: the medical or the educative.[65] Nevertheless, for the present purposes it can be understood uncontroversially as operating as follows: during the pilgrimage, the burdens that pilgrims might have, can be led by this catharsis, to a reaggregation of the difficulties into their lives and enable them to figure out some dilemma or other issues. Because uncertainties and challenges of pilgrimage may remind pilgrims of a complex feeling, those sufferings and burdens in life do not merely appear without further consequence However, despite the cathartic experience, we might not understand or foresee that consequence yet. So, Aristotle remarked that "tragedy, then, is an imitation of an action that is serious and complete, and which has some greatness about it."[66] In this Aristotelian view, watching a tragedy can be identified as a parallel to going on pilgrimage because a pilgrim may realize what has happened in the past, when one observes all surroundings of oneself, and purges oneself from the recalled sufferings. This kind of 'imitation' might

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[64] Aristotle, *The Basic Works of Aristotle, Poetics,* Cp. 9.

[65] Russell M. Dancy, "Aristotle," *in A Companion to the Philosophers*, ed. Robert L. Arrington (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Limited, 1994), 141.

[66] Aristotle, *The Basic Works of Aristotle, Poetics*, 1449b 21.

show a pilgrim that life is similar to a pilgrimage: it is always on the way to the further end, and there is hope along the journey. This notion of 'on the way' resonates with the Christian theological virtue hope, as understood by Josef Pieper,[67] the relationship with pilgrimage, which will be examined in Chapter 3 of this book. In the modern interpretation, however it is enough to see that catharsis could be seen as a manner to relieve a negative emotion through rituals and mass entertainments.[68] Hence, it is because there is an experience of *catharsis* during the pilgrimage, from which pilgrims can know themselves in-depth from those difficulties and challenges in the past: pilgrimage is, therefore, understood as a journey of purification.

It is useful to note that the definition of pilgrimage is highly relevant to and dependent upon one's spirituality. Willson et al., who undertook a phenomenological analysis of spirituality and tourism, indicated that the touristic experience is a lived experience with a spiritual dimension. In order to understand the lived experience, we ought to see how "individuals subjectively seek the meaning and life purpose of themselves, and their quest for meaning, and experiences of transcendence and connectedness through travel."[69] A touristic experience does not only denote travel *per se*, as with traditionally understood pilgrimage, but it should also be linked with the tourists/pilgrims' subjective context of their life and beliefs. A phenomenological analysis can detail a pilgrim's experience precisely as a lived experience connected with the individual's own spiritual activities.

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[67] Josef Pieper, *Faith, Hope, Love* (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1997), 94.

[68] Thomas J. Scheff, Catharsis in Healing, Ritual, and Drama (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979), 144–48. It is worth noting that Josef Pieper holds that, at its root, catharsis is a joyful experience because it is an experience that purifies the soul and affirms the past, through being drawn into the tragedy as a spectator/witness. See Josef Pieper, *An Anthology* (San Francisco:Ignatius Press, 1989), 155.

[69] Gregory B. Willson, Alison J. McIntosh, and Anne. L. Zahra, "Tourism and Spirituality: A Phenomenological Analysis," *Annals of Tourism Research* 42 (July 2013): 150, accessed June 11, 2020, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.annals.2013.01.016.

Once we examine the pilgrim's spirituality, we can begin to observe how the pilgrim might have an experience of something that is beyond the knowledge attained by sensory power during the pilgrimage. To have an analysis of a pilgrimage as a 'thing' or 'object' itself is insufficient to give us the whole picture of what pilgrimage is. Phenomenology is useful in this regard insofar as it enables us to uncover the spiritual dimension of pilgrims with regard to their pilgrimage.

As has been shown, the word pilgrimage itself means a journey involving travelling to a foreign place distinguished to the pilgrim's homeland. The interpretations of pilgrimage are varied, and pilgrimages have been shown as having been understood in terms of an encounter with the divine, of a self-realization, of a purification, of a purgation and healing of the scars of experience in life, and of a spiritual retrospection. Deductively, from this analysis, we might reasonably hypothesize that religiosity and spirituality are the main two characteristics of pilgrimage, without which no journey can properly be understood as a pilgrimage. The phenomenology of pilgrimage, however, indicates, as will be shown in the remainder of this book, a broader and dynamic understanding, because contemporary pilgrimage shares many phenomenological commonalities with tourism.[70] Noga Collins-Kreiner argues that "[a]ny distinction between the pilgrimages of the past and today's tourism is hard to discern."[71] If this is correct then the overlap between pilgrimage and tourism might even obscure the distinctive aspects of pilgrimage. Perhaps, even joining the event of Tourist Trophy motorcycle races can be considered as a pilgrimage.[72]

[70] Reader, *Pilgrimage*, 17–19.

[71] Collins-Kreiner, "Geographers and Pilgrimages," 446.

[72] Avril Maddrell, Alan Terry, and Tim Gale, "'At Least Once in a Lifetime': Sports Pilgrimage and Constructions of the TT Races as 'Sacred' Journey," in *Sacred Mobilities Journeys of Belief and Belonging,* ed. Avril Maddrell, Alan Terry, and Tim Gale (London: Routledge, 2018), 72.

On the other hand, "the Way of Saint James is a tourist product in itself,"[73] as Fernandez Belén notes. The pilgrimage of Saint James is no longer based solely on religious motivation but is connected with culture and heritage, relaxation and pleasure. Thus, a question arises: do religious and spiritual aspects still matter in pilgrimage? This present work does not provide a new definition or set novel restrictions on what can be considered to be pilgrimage. Instead, it observes what the phenomena of pilgrimage can tell us about the idea itself. From the observation of these phenomena, we can consider what kinds of perceptions of pilgrimage the pilgrim has? After describing the perceptions, we 'suspend' the common understandings and contemplate them in favor of gaining a transcendental understanding of pilgrimage as a phenomenon that the manifestation of pilgrimage being within the intentionalities of pilgrims. These intentionalities correlate with pilgrims' perceptions of the various aspects of pilgrimage. For instance, pilgrims might look for happiness or pleasure through an encounter of the divine and a new awareness of the meaning of life during a religious pilgrimage. Correspondingly, in the contemporary pilgrimage, what kind of happiness or pleasure is it that pilgrims intend to have?

[73] Belén María Castro Fernández, "The Way of Saint James: Memory, Propaganda and Power," in *Sacred Mobilities Journeys of Belief and Belonging*, ed. Avril Maddrell, Alan Terry, and Tim Gale (London; New York: Routledge, 2018), 135.

Chapter 2. Comparing Christian Pilgrimage with Secular Pilgrimage

2.1 Religious Pilgrimage in General

A religious pilgrimage is characterized by its motivation, which is to search for what truth, sacred or holy is.[74] Sacred sites become pilgrims' destination. The distinction between sacred and profane makes religious pilgrimage different from other journeys. As mentioned in Chapter 1, Mircea Eliade remarks the dichotomy of sacred and profane. Accordingly, sacred sites are places where believers believe that a theophany or hierophany has happened in the 'center' of such locations. Thus, a journey that considers a sacred site as a center from which pilgrims might have an encounter with the divine is a religious pilgrimage.

In order to undertake a phenomenological analysis, it is necessary to describe what the religious pilgrimage is in the natural attitude and to analyze it based on the three structures with a phenomenological approach.[75] A religious pilgrimage in the natural attitude pertains to: how does it appear to pilgrims and what are the common beliefs of religious pilgrimage? Further, what are the intentionalities that pilgrims have? One might experience a pilgrimage as a faithful and pious devotion, as a spiritual journey, as a visit to the sacred sites. These intentionalities are perceived from experiences of religious pilgrimages. Since we are going to turn to a phenomenological investigation, we have to start from these beliefs in the natural attitude. This section will generally analyze religious pilgrimage according to the three

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[74] Dallen J. Timothy and Daniel H. Olsen, eds., *Tourism, Religion, and Spiritual Journeys*, Routledge Studies in Contemporary Geographies of Leisure, Tourism, and Mobility (New York: Routledge, 2006), 3.

[75] See n. 24 and check correlated contents in the chapter of methodology.

structures noted by Sokolowski: *parts and wholes, identity in a manifold, and presence and absence.*

First, we would describe them under the aspects of parts and wholes. Wholes can be analyzed into *pieces and moments*, numbers of 'pieces' can become a part, and parts can become a whole. In the same way, a 'piece' consists of numbers of 'moments'. However, 'moment' is *nonindependent.*[76] That is to say, those factors are 'moments', which generate rituals, prayers, spiritual reflection as pieces. Looking for sacredness is identified as a 'moment' that cannot be segmented or separated from the whole, an *expression* that here refers to a whole journey. When people intend to make a religious pilgrimage out of religious or spiritual inspiration, we might find them bearing such factors, however, what these experiences give to us is 'sacredness', as a moment of a whole is inseparable from a religious pilgrimage. So, piety, faith, and spirituality appear during the pilgrimage: they are the 'moments' of the whole phenomenon of pilgrimage. This description seems trivial but once we mistakenly take a moment as a piece, and a piece as a whole, then it will lead us to a misinterpretation of religious pilgrimage that equals one of the elements.

The second of Sokolowski's terms is *identity in manifolds.*[77] When Christian believers describe the phenomenon of religious pilgrimage, they might state that it is a journey to deepen their faith. Alternatively, observant Jews would say that it fulfills their religious obligations, whilst Hindu believers might express that it is an opportunity to attain enlightenment.

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[76] Sokolowski, *Introduction to Phenomenology,* 24.

[77] Ibid., 27–32.

Nevertheless, although these are various preconceptions of the phenomenon of pilgrimage, they are the presentation of the identity of religious pilgrimage. Sokolowski notes that "the identity transcends its manifold of presentations, it goes beyond them,"[78] even though this identity will be given to us by other means. It is because when we perceive one thing from one angle, we can lose the presentations of other sides. At the same time, when we turn to another angle, the former can be or become a memory which we understand precisely as a memory but not a perception. Therefore, investigating the identity of pilgrimage is necessary. From the examination of its parts and wholes, we may conclude of pilgrimage that all such actions are intended to have an encounter with a divine from which pilgrims might seek out some meaning. In the next section, by means of phenomenological reduction, a detailed explanation of the identity of Christian pilgrimage will be attempted.

Furthermore, if religious pilgrims intend to go to a sacred site in order to have an encounter with a divine, one may ask: how would a place or an object become sacred? Religious pilgrims might claim such places as sacred because they are in accord with practices of particular religious communities: yet, by way of contrast, tourists might find aesthetic pleasure in the same place understood as an expression of cultural heritage or beauty.[79] The different interpretations of a place do not change its identity. The sacredness of sacred places is irreducible to human efforts.[80] This understanding pertains to the generic definition of sacred, which, according to Eliade, is "the opposite of the profane."[81] John Dadosky further remarks on

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[78] Ibid., 30.

[79] Timothy and Olsen, *Tourism, Religion, and Spiritual Journeys,* 33.

[80] Dadosky, *The Structure of Religious Knowing,* 68.

[81] Eliade, *The Sacred and the Profane*, 10.

Eliade's definition that this relationship between the sacred and the profane is paradoxical. It is paradoxical because, first, it relies upon the definition of a thing as sacred but concomitantly manifested and limited in the profane world. He notes that the Incarnation of Christ is an example, in which God, the unlimited and entirely sacred, accepts limitations by becoming a man, Jesus Christ, in the profane world.[82] Second, the manifestation of the sacred is showing itself, at the same time as 'camouflages' itself. Even though tourists and archaeologists in general, might unconsciously repress a sense of the sacred, the identity of the sacredness of a sacred place remains irreducible. For Bernard Lonergan, the experience of an encounter of the divine is a 'mediated return to immediacy'.[83] His notion has resonances with Eliade's paradoxical notion that to have a sense of sacredness it is required to withdraw from mediation or objectification into immediate experience. That is to say, to understand an experience of an encounter with the divine requires us not engaging in discursive thought but simply intuition. Thus, an encounter is "rather the gift of God's love,"[84] which pertains to the identity of religious pilgrimage.

Last, an encounter with the divine is what pilgrims would expect as a transcendent experience by which one attains enlightenment or spiritual growth. Some would argue that given that there is no phenomenology without phenomena, how can one perceive something that does not appear to be visible or perceptible to the other physical senses? Jean-Yves Lacoste would answer that "precisely that 'appearing' is more than 'being presented

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[82] Dadosky, *The Structure of Religious Knowing,* 70.

[83] Bernard Lonergan, *Method in Theology* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), 77.

[84] Dadosky, *The Structure of Religious Knowing*, 73.

by our senses.'"[85] We can perceive the visible by sensation, but this is not 'adequate'. Even though we cannot see the invisible, we can perceive it 'symbolically'. These two kinds of perception: 'adequate' and 'symbolic' parallels Sokolowski's notion of *presence and absence*. One can perceive the identity of an object by either its presence or by its absence. Both modes are correlated with each other, but one object is at one time absent and at another present. In other words, there is an identity behind and in both presence and absence. Therefore, the encounter of the divine, which is the true reality or identity of religious pilgrimage, is fulfilled or recognized by both visible and invisible sides of this phenomenon.

We have briefly described a religious pilgrimage. This description is aimed at facilitating a phenomenological reduction from which we can neutralize or interrupt our natural attention of understanding in the natural attitude. So, the next step is the so-called *epoché* or 'suspension', in favor of neutralizing the common beliefs of religious pilgrimages because to know the whole phenomenon of pilgrimage according to this phenomenological methodology, it is specifically inadequate to have an analysis of the pilgrimage itself. In other words, this neutralization is the reason why we can have an 'overlook' on: how does the desire of an encounter with the divine appear in consciousness or show itself during a pilgrimage as a lived experience? Specifically, we will examine how pilgrims anticipate, perceive and remember the phenomenon of Christian pilgrimage. Led by the reduction, we will gain an overview of the phenomenon of Christian pilgrimages and evaluate the differences between a Christian pilgrimage and a secular pilgrimage in the next section.

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[85] Jean-Yves Lacoste, "Perception, Transcendence and the Experience of God," in *Transcendence and Phenomenology*, ed. Conor Cunningham and Peter M. Candler (London; Nottingham: SCM Press; The Centre of Theology and Philosophy University of Nottingham, 2007), 4.

2.2 Religious Pilgrimage in Christianity

2.2.1 Overview of Pilgrimage in Christianity Through History

Chronologically, in the Christian tradition, Abrahamic pilgrimage would be considered as the first pilgrimage. Abraham departed from his homeland Ur, passed through Haran, eventually arrived in the Promised Land. It is by faith that he "went out, not knowing where he was to go,"[86] and he sojourned in the Promised Land as a foreigner. Even though he seemed to finish his pilgrimage and arrived at the destination, he was still a foreigner, a peregininі in this world. For he still lived in his tent and claimed to be as a stranger and alien on earth when he died.[87] By faith and virtue, Abraham begins his pilgrimage without a concrete notion of where he would be led, only following what he believed to be God's will.

Later, in Jewish tradition, it suggests that people should make a pilgrimage to Jerusalem three times a year.[88] Jesus Christ reveals a pilgrimage in that life is a journey to the Heavenly Jerusalem. Furthermore, He takes himself as an example, bears sufferings, and dies on Golgotha, outside the walls of Jerusalem. It does not become the end of his life, however, since the tradition attests that He is resurrected and ascends into Heaven with His apostles as witnesses. The pilgrimage of Jesus ends at a transcendent destination, where, beyond death, eternal happiness might be found. Therefore, the life of Jesus Christ provokes in the early Christian an attitude of life as a pilgrimage. The apostle Peter, in his letters, also addresses the other Christians by the title

[86] See Heb 11:8−9.

[87] See Gen 23:4.

[88] See Deut 16:16

'sojourners' (παροίκους) or aliens in the world.[89] This understanding of pilgrimage spread among the early Christian communities in the first and second centuries. The early Church Fathers, in particular, followed this idea, and sought to imitate it in their lives.[90]

In the late second century and early third century, Tertullian, one of the Church Fathers from Carthage, noted to his community that "you are a foreigner in this world, a citizen of Jerusalem, the city above. Our citizenship, the apostle says, is in heaven."[91] In urging others to detach themselves from earthly possessions, he used 'citizenship' as analogous to the journey of the Christian life, bound for the heavenly Jerusalem. Another Carthagian father, Cyprian, also reckoned a nostalgia of going back to the 'country' where he regarded as paradise and asked: "Who that has been placed in foreign lands would not hasten to return to his own country?"[92] Instead of having a physical pilgrimage to the holy places, both fathers exhorted believers to live an 'ascetic' life as a stranger (Gr. *Xenos*), sojourner (Gr. *Paroikos*) on earth, and to disengage from the material temptations. Thus, from the words of Tertullian and Cyprian, we can see that understanding the Christian way of life as walking a pilgrimage was common among early Christian communities.[93]

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[89] See 1 Peter 1:1,17; ibid., 2:11

[90] See Tertullian, *De Exhortatione Castitatis* 12,1.

[91] *De corona* 13, 4.

[92] *De Mortalitate* 26.

[93] Manns, "世上的僑民及旅客：厄彼翁派的淵源 Étranger et Pèlerin En Ce Monde Ou Les Racines de l'ébionisme," 6.

In the fourth and fifth centuries, believers began to undertake pilgrimages to the Holy Land.[94] Whether formal pilgrimage existed before the legalization of Christianity in the Roman Empire in 313 A.D. (Edict of Milan) is a matter of some debate and, whilst this discussion is outside the scope of this present work, "it is unlikely pilgrimage suddenly sprang into being as a mature phenomenon in the early fourth century."[95] Some Christian pilgrims might perceive a pilgrimage to the Holy Land as an acculturated or a social activity. Thus, Church Fathers from Alexandria and Cappadocia give several expressions of pilgrimage under the spiritual context. For instance, Gregory of Nyssa wrote a letter to those who are concerned about making a pilgrimage to Jerusalem as a means of imitating the hermetic life; in addition, he criticized those who embarked on a pilgrimage without practicing virtue. Gregory further referred to Jesus' Sermon on the Mount and noted that "He (Jesus) does not include a pilgrimage to Jerusalem among their good deeds,"[96] which indicated that pilgrimage is not an obligation for the faithful. Moreover, Gregory stressed the importance of the practice or cultivation of virtue because "of that contemplative Life the peculiar mark is Modesty."[97] He emphasized that the value of pilgrimage is found in the spiritual journey of the soul.[98] At the end of his letter, it is good, explicitly remarks Gregory, "to be absent from the body to go to our Lord, rather than to be absent from Cappadocia to go to Palestine."

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[94] Anne McGowan and Paul F. Bradshaw, eds., *The Pilgrimage of Egeria: A New Translation of the Itinerarium Egeriae with Introduction and Commentary,* Alcuin Club Collections, no. 93 (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press Academic, 2018), 27.

[95] Wendy Pullan, "'Intermingled Until the End of Time': Ambiguity as a Central Condition of Early Christian Pilgrimage," in *Pilgrimage in Graeco-Roman and Early Christian Antiquity*, ed. Jaś Elsner and Ian Rutherford (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 396.

[96] *Epistle* 2.5.

[97] *Epistle* 2.7.

[98] Pullan, "'Intermingled Until the End of Time,'" 402.

Whereas Gregory of Nyssa developed an argument against the necessity of pilgrimage; other Fathers argued that mobility does bring one closer to God.[99] Although Jerome, who began his religious pilgrimage from Rome to Holy Land in 386 A.D. and settled in Bethlehem, offered a more favorable opinion of pilgrimage, overall, his letters are of a similar tone to Gregory's.[100] In his *Letter* 58, Jerome tried to convince his friend Paulinus of Nola not to make a pilgrimage to Holy Land. He also agreed that practicing virtue is a key element of pilgrimage because those holy sites "profit those only who bear their several crosses."[101] In *Letter* 108, he reassured his reader, Eustochium of the value of pilgrimage, upon the death of Paula, who had accompanied him, and set up monasteries and a pilgrim's house in the Holy Land. He praised Paula for the way in which she became detached from her possessions and so her soul flourished as "disinheriting herself upon earth that she might find an inheritance in heaven."[102] That is to say, Paula had spiritually lived a pilgrimage-like life while she was living in the Holy Land. She withdrew from her noble life into a pilgrim life. Further, she foretasted the happiness of eternal life[103] by her passion for going to holy places[104] and dwelling there. The spiritual experience transforms her into an inner spiritual journey where she is bound for the union with God after the pilgrimage on earth ended.

To conclude this brief survey of the different understandings of pilgrimage among early Christian communities in the Patristic era, we see

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[99] Robert L. Wilken, *The Land Called Holy: Palestine in Christian History and Thought* (New Haven; London: Yale University Press, 1992), 118, accessed May 2, 2020, https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1cc2mc8.

[100] Pullan, "'Intermingled Until the End of Time,'" 403.

[101] *Letter* 58.3.

[102] *Letter* 108.6.

[103] *Letter* 108.22.

[104] *Letter* 108.7–14.

that Christian pilgrimage exists as a mediation between the physical journey and the pure contemplation of God because "the physical (pilgrimage) cannot be separated from spiritual."[105] In other words, to know God and seek Heaven are clear motivations of some in the early Christian communities for making a pilgrimage. Making a physical pilgrimage to the Holy Land signifies, in this context, a spiritual journey to find God by self-retrospection.[106] Upon the arrival in the Holy Land, which is the goal of the physical pilgrimage, the pilgrim might feel happy in the manner that Jerome tries to convince his friend Marcella as expressed in Letter 46.[107] Even if pilgrims might fall short of the goal of the spiritual pilgrimage, which is the pure contemplation of Heaven and God, they may desire a foretaste of their 'sweetness'. Therefore, the realization of being on the way to the ultimate goal enables one to live a holier life, and pilgrimage has a role in that process as a means of mediation between the present and the end goal.

There are some journals or diaries recording journeys to the Holy land during the fourth and fifth centuries, such as the famous *Itinerarium Egeriae*,[108] *The Bordeaux Pilgrim*.[109] These diaries indicate the Christian practices, liturgy and experiences of pilgrims in the Holy Land at that time. However, in 638 A.D., after the Arabs conquered Jerusalem, Christian pilgrimage to the Holy Land became increasingly difficult. As a consequence, Rome became the alternative destination, because it was the site

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[105] Pullan, "'*Intermingled Until the End of Time,'*" 406.

[106] This term is used here, in contradistinction to the notion of introspection understood as primarily speculative and discursive. See https://www.differencebetween.com/difference-between-introspection-and-vs-retrospection/, accessed April 20, 2020.

[107] *Letter* 46 13.

[108] McGowan and Bradshaw, eds., *The Pilgrimage of Egeria.*

[109] Aubrey Stewart, trans., *Itinerary from Bordeaux to Jerusalem: "the Bordeaux Pilgrim" (333 a. d.)* (London: FORGOTTEN Books, 2016).

of martyrdom of Peter and Paul. In addition, the tomb of St. James in Compostela, Spain, became another destination of Christian pilgrimage in Europe. Further pilgrimage destinations evolved, including Marian shrines such as the Holy House of Loreto.[110]

Later, in Geoffrey Chaucer's classic work, *The Canterbury Tales*,[111] he presented the phenomenon of pilgrimage in England in the eighth and fourteenth centuries. The book contains a number of stories or tales told by pilgrims, who were going to Canterbury where they could pay respects at the shrine of St. Thomas Becket, the martyred Archbishop of Canterbury. Mainly pilgrims went with a group to the tomb of St. Thomas Becket out of religious devotion, but Chaucer's *Tales* make clear that some of them might have a secondary purpose for making a pilgrimage.

In 1300, Pope Boniface VIII established the Jubilee Year in Rome, which meant that Catholic believers could have a plenary indulgence if they made a pilgrimage to Rome. Boniface intended that these Jubilee Years would occur once every century but later, the period between Jubilee years was shortened to every 25 years.[112] With travel getting easier and safer in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the destinations of Christian pilgrimages expanded, no longer restricted to certain traditional sacred places or seasons. Various pilgrimage destinations developed, such as to the shrines or basilicas of memorials of Marian apparitions of Guadalupe in Mexico, Lourdes in France, Fatima in Portugal, etc. As Pope Pius XII in

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[110] Pontifical Council for the Pastoral Care of Migrants and Itinerant People, "Great Jubilee 1998,"§. 14, April 14, 1998, accessed March 10, 2020, https://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/pontifical_councils/migrants/documents/rc_pc_migrants_doc_19980425_pilgrimage_en.htm.

[111] Geoffrey Chaucer, *The Canterbury Tales*, ed. Jill Mann (London: Penguin Books, 2005).

[112] "Jubilee 1300: the first Holy year," *Giubileo 2025−Il Giubileo e la Chiesa Cattolica* (blog), March 29, 2015, accessed May 3, 2020, https://www.giubileopapafrancesco.it/jubilee-1300-the-first-holy-year

1952 noted, "pilgrimage instructs the pilgrim afresh about the meaning of life: to turn away from the present, from everyday joys and sorrows, and to turn towards the goal whose radiance shines on you."[113] Piety and self-retrospection are still a part of the motivations of Christian pilgrims in contemporary society, treating pilgrimage as a retreat from a daily life that might be full of toil and hard work, and taking the opportunity to reflect upon the meaning of life through spiritual experiences during the pilgrimage.

Pope Benedict XVI recognized that people who go to Santiago de Compostela intend to seek truth and beauty. In the depth of each pilgrim, he claims that:

> to everyone who seeks inner silence, who keeps passions, desires and immediate occupations at a distance, to the one who prays, God grants the light to find him and to acknowledge Christ. Deep down, all those who come on pilgrimage to Santiago do so in order to encounter God who, reflected in the majesty of Christ, welcomes and blesses them as they reach the *Pórtico de la Gloria*.[114]

Pilgrims might bear different motivations on a pilgrimage. They might speak about the beauty of the variety of landscapes; they might feel pleasant to meet people from all over the world; they might seek the meaning of life or self-discovery. Even though there are various motivations for contemporary

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[113] Sausser Ekkart, "Pilgrimage," in *Sacramentum Mundi: An Encyclopedia of Theology,* ed. Karl Rahner, Cornelius Ernst, and Kevin Smyth (New York: Herder and Herder, n.d.), 27–28.

[114] Benedict XVI, "Holy Mass on the Occasion of the Compostelian Jubilee Year," November 6, 2010, accessed May 3, 2020, http://www.vatican.va/content/benedict-xvi/en/homilies/2010/documents/hf_ben-xvihom_20101106_compostela.html.

Christian pilgrims, the Pope proposed that they would eventually be led by the Holy Spirit into the deepest desire that is the encounter with God.

In this overview of the development of Christian pilgrimage from the period of the early Church to the contemporary world, we conclude that a historical review of Christian pilgrimage itself provides a largely settled understanding of what it is. How pilgrims perceive a pilgrimage, however, is not answered by this historical treatment. That is to say, the pilgrims' experiences of pilgrimage are left unexamined by it and these experiences cannot be ignored in the discussion of pilgrimage as a phenomenon. Furthermore, since our conscious state and the world are correlated, the consciousness of pilgrims straightforwardly constitutes a knowledge of pilgrimage as it exists in the world. In other words, when an individual takes a rational approach towards an object, it is necessary for us to look at how that individual has a consciousness of that object rather than merely considering that object theoretically or with abstract speculations.

Describing the importance of the subjectivity, Nickolas Davey quoted McIntosh's remarks that "spirituality entails a discovery of the 'self' precisely in its encounter with the divine and human other … spirituality as the transformation and discovery of the 'self' always happens in encounter."[115] McIntosh suggests that an encounter of the divine means and leads towards the discovering of the spiritual dimension of oneself. Thus, a spiritual experience or one's spirituality is the 'acquaintance' with self and an encounter with the divine. This resonates with why the Church Fathers urged

[115] Nicolas Davey, "Double Reflection: Gadamer, Aesthetics and the Question of Spiritual Experience," in *Transcendence and Phenomenology*, ed. Conor Cunningham and Peter M. Candler (London; Nottingham: SCM Press; The Centre of Theology and Philosophy University of Nottingham, 2007), 161. Mark Allen McIntosh, *Mystical Theology: The Integrity of Spirituality and Theology* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), 5−6.

pilgrims not only to imitate the hermitic life and to visit the sacred sites in the Holy Land, but essentially to exercise their virtues and to nurture a flourishing spiritual life. Therefore, in order for disclosing the complex phenomena of Christian pilgrimage, a phenomenological approach is called for: given that Christian pilgrims go on a pilgrimage as a spiritual experience, as a journey to experience an encounter with God, how they anticipate, perceive and remember such an experience is crucial for understanding the very concept of pilgrimage.

2.2.2 Phenomenology of Christian Pilgrimage

From this historical overview of Christian Pilgrimage, we have observed that Christian pilgrims would make a journey to sacred places as the destination of pilgrimage. By applying the phenomenological method, we shall provide a necessary perspective on the different intentionalities of an experience of pilgrimage for Christians and consider how that might differ from other intentionalities. In order to do this, first, we will describe and analyze under the 'natural attitude', the first element of Christian pilgrimage-journey: its forms of physical and spiritual expression.

On the one hand, some Christian pilgrims might intend to trace the historical, geographical locations where their faith originates. They might develop intellectual understandings of what they believe in by following Jesus' footprints in the Holy Land. As one cannot remove all the dust and hairs in order to see one's skin, analogously, it is not possible to claim to know Jesus 'directly' independent of the historical facts that can be ascertained about him with reasonable certainty. Incidentally, some

Christian pilgrims might look forward to deepening their faith by transcending those intellectual understandings. Perhaps, some may argue that it is not necessary to deepen one's faith by making a pilgrimage; instead, allowing the faithful heart to flourish could be achieved everywhere. As we noted, in the Patristic era, Gregory of Nyssa and Jerome encouraged pilgrims not only to focus on their destination but primarily to build up an intensified spiritual relationship with God and live authentically a virtuous life.[116]

On the other hand, some Christian pilgrims emphasize their spiritual journey or process of personal growth rather than the physical journey to and arrival at sacred sites. Thus, there is a debate about whether the essence of pilgrimage engages more in the movement or in the destination.[117] For instance, some who walk the *Camino*, the Way of Santiago, might intend to emphasize 'the way' to the destination rather than the arrival. Another pilgrimage route in Spain, the Ignatian Way from Loyola to Manresa and Barcelona, might also have a similar significance as the one to Santiago. Ignatius, the founder of the Jesuits, conceded that he was graced with a profound spiritual illumination during his own pilgrimage towards Manresa and that, some years later and shaped by that illumination, he found and lived his personal vocation by establishing what became the Society of Jesus.[118] Later, Ignatius even added a rule that all Jesuits should make a pilgrimage of one month without money during the period of their formation. By undertaking this pilgrimage, the scholastics might encounter various

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[116] Pullan, "'Intermingled Until the End of Time,'" 406.

[117] Reader, *Pilgrimage*, 23.

[118] Jose Luis Iriberri and Chris Lowney, On the Ignatian Way: *A Pilgrimage in the Footsteps of Saint Ignatius of Loyola* (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2018), 18–20.

unexpected difficulties and through them develop and deepen their personal reliance on God alone.[119]

Describing these various examples enables us to identify that some Christian pilgrimages might not place their emphasis on the rituals or specific worship at the destination, the center. Rather, they disclose that the intention is one of having a spiritual experience by self-discovery and prayer while on the way to the center. During the journey, they might make friends and chat with other pilgrims; they might share their life experiences; or, they might pray a rosary along the way; some of them might have reflected upon the past or contemplated only on what is present before their eyes; pilgrims might begin an internal journey from which a spiritual experience might emerge. They might have an exalted moment of spiritual insight or enlightenment; they might open their heart and embrace the connection between external or conceptual reality and the self.

If, "embracing the discipline of spiritual experience is to accept a ready openness"[120] where this spiritual openness pertains to the pilgrim's intentionality in their consciousness of knowing one's spirituality, then the Christian pilgrim, in making a pilgrimage, can be seen as engaging in a quest for meanings about their life and faith. Moreover, this quest for meaning precisely in its conscious intentionality is not merely a "penetration of things" but a "fundamental willingness to face what is real" and "what is unfathomable."[121] Thus, for a spiritual experience to occur during the pilgrimage requires the pilgrims' openness, which brings one to have an encounter with God. This encounter may highlight the

[119] Ibid., 46.

[120] Davey, "Double Reflection: Gadamer, Aesthetics and the Question of Spiritual Experience," 164.

[121] Ibid., 166–7.

distinction between the pilgrimage and other touristic experiences, because this encounter (or at least the intention and longing that there should be one) brings the pilgrim into contact with the mystery of God.[122] It is not part of this argument to assess the reality or what is otherwise called the question of the existence of God. We focus here only on the personal aspect or reality of intentionality and in this case its ultimate 'mysterious object' called in the 'God' tradition. Nickolas Davey argues that rather than being capable of being solved, "mysteries can only be understood more deeply."[123] Mysteries are not objects of a problem-solution paradigm but, according to Davey's argumentation, invoke a deeper understanding about a subject matter.

This description of spiritual experience enables us to see that pilgrimage presents itself as a retreat, during which pilgrims can free themselves from their normal obligations and social restrictions and set out upon a quest for the existential meaning of oneself, of others, and of the world. The place where this occurs is the center. This center is no longer a physical hierophanic place but a spiritual theophanic intra-world of oneself where he or she can have an encounter with God. Thus, the emphasis of 'journey' and center is not primarily a physical one, even though pilgrims walk a physical journey and arrive at a physical destination. As a result of making a pilgrimage with our emphasis on the spiritual journey and center, we contend that the pilgrims might intend to receive an existential understanding of themselves, one that is, perhaps, an experience of the pleasure which lasts even when the pilgrimage has finished. When

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[122] To know more about the Mystery of God in Christian tradition, see, Teresa of Avila, *Interior Castle,* ed. E. Allison Peers (Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, Inc., 2012). John of the Cross, *Dark Night of the Soul.*, trans. E. Allison Peers (Mineola, NY: Dover Publications Inc., 2012). William Johnston, ed., *The Cloud of Unknowing and The Book of Privy Counseling* (New York: Image Books/Doubleday, 2005). Regarding modern spiritual traditions, see Thomas Merton, *New Seeds of Contemplation,* New Directions Paper Book 1091 (New York: New Directions Book, 2007).

[123] Davey, "Double Reflection: Gadamer, Aesthetics and the Question of Spiritual Experience," 167.

pilgrims return to their homeland, in the light of this recalled experience, they might change existentially, and be able to live what they consider to be a better life.

Next, we are going to consider another element—center. In order to accomplish this, we will first describe the experience of pilgrims who go to the Holy Land as a physical center. Second, we consider how they are enabled to arrive at a spiritual center through encountering the various religious activities celebrated at the physical center. Finally, we will consider the claim that pilgrims experience personal joy and pleasure by arriving at their own spiritual center or self. We attempt to approach disinterested (with bracketing or *epoché*) the common understandings of center and its relevant knowledge of pilgrimage, in order to seek the transcendental understanding of Christian pilgrimage. This transcendental understanding is based on pilgrims' conscious state and the reality of being on pilgrimage.

Obvious though it may seem, first of all, the beginning of a pilgrimage to the Holy Land for an individual requires a decision by the putative pilgrim to travel to that Holy Land on pilgrimage. A group of people bound together by the common purpose of going to a place from which some important aspects of their faith arises set off from their 'home' towards that specific location and place (center). Before the pilgrimage begins, they know that making this journey to the Holy Land will entail efforts and will even be exhausting, at least, making them more tired than on other travels. This awareness comes from their appreciating that the pilgrimage will involve, for example walking for long periods of time under the hot sun, the encounter of feelings of insecurity aroused due to

clashes between Arabs and Jews. However, they still desire to withdraw from their comfortable daily lives and embark on this pilgrimage out of faithful devotion or even simple curiosity. Pilgrims intend to go to a place or several sites in which they feel their faith could be advanced and deepened. These sites appear themselves not just as touristic spots but spaces that are mainly relevant to pilgrims' faith. Therefore, the intentionality of pilgrims going to the Holy Land is not only that of visiting or tracing certain historical events and geographical places, but that when they are going to these places, they might be instilled with a consciousness of a transcendent experience or more profound understanding of their faith.

Second, during their pilgrimage, it is typical that the pilgrims study the historical, archeological, and geographical situation and the corresponding events mentioned in the Holy Scriptures. Again, why would they deepen their understanding of the Scriptures by visiting relevant specific places but not only by reading in a library or by enrolling in biblical classes? It is because of the experience of exaltation coming along with the personal visit of respective locations through which pilgrims might be deeply touched and opened in view of gaining a transcendent understanding, which they might not encounter by mere reading literary sources. On the one hand, by tracing the historical footprints of Jesus of Nazareth, pilgrims are enabled to deepen their practical and intellectual understandings of some aspects of their faith tradition. These insights and new understanding might help them to acquire a better imagination or picture of the biblical account. Of course, pilgrims might be able to obtain cognitively the same knowledge without venturing making a pilgrimage. Yet, given that all such pilgrims have some knowledge or belief in Jesus, for example, in his resurrection, when pilgrim gets inside the tomb (which is

the so-called *aedicule*) where the resurrection is believed to have taken place, they might naturally experience a personal and spiritual exaltation that they would never have experienced without this physical encounter.

From this observation, there are two different perceptions of the same event. One is merely lying on the level of intellectual understanding: another is located at the transcendental level. It is transcendental because it is 'hidden', and the hiddenness correlates with an 'empty intention'. The empty intention is that of knowing or believing that an event took place in some place at which the pilgrim is, until they reach that place. Eventually, this intention becomes 'present' upon the fulfillment of the 'empty intention', which occurs when entering inside the *aedicule*, the center of this particular journey. This phenomenon can be identified with the idea of *liminality in a rite of passage*.[124] Pilgrims, upon arriving at the physical center, may have a sense of a ravishment or an exaltation, a sense of the fulfillment of the empty intention experienced as an event that transcends their natural aspect. This experience is considered as the liminal state of a rite of passage, which happens during the specific time-space of the pilgrimage. Moreover, the pilgrim's intentionality of the same event has been changed by this liminal moment, from going on a physical pilgrimage into delving into a vivid spiritual pilgrimage experience.

Pilgrims practice rituals and various acts of worship during a pilgrimage; in particular, for Catholics, the celebration of the Mass is a common experience. A daily Mass during the pilgrimage can trigger in pilgrims a

[124] Victor W. Turner and Edith L. B. Turner, *Image and Pilgrimage in Christian Culture,* Columbia Classics in Religion (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), 249.

sense of communitas: meaning, together with their fellow pilgrims, they experiencea deep and shared heightened state of consciousness.[125] Such a sense of *communitas* might be the reason that some pilgrims experience the daily Mass during the pilgrimage in a considerably different way than the daily Mass which they celebrated in their homeland. Furthermore, this sense of heightened spiritual awareness enables many of them to overcome social structures existing at home or in the past and to move towards sharing and deepening in some way a new and common identity, through which they understand themselves and others more authentically and deeply, at least during the time of the pilgrimage experience. They do this precisely as pilgrims in a pilgrimage group, notwithstanding other identities inherited or carried over from their life at home. In this liminal phase, a pilgrim might explore his or her true self or may encounter God during a Mass. Thus, the daily Mass of a pilgrimage becomes a *rite of passage* that only occurs during the pilgrimage and which the pilgrims recall after the pilgrimage has been finished. Here the phenomenon of the daily Mass is not just a habitual religious activity; rather, it has been transformed into a moment when people who are bound together in a common endeavor (pilgrimage) with similar intentionalities, experience the all too familiar in a new, different, and intensified way, because of that commonality and similarity. That it occurs in a ritual manner, enables the familiar to become liminal and so facilitate a passage and transition in understanding and consciousness.

Fourth, pilgrims are sharing their joy and pleasure with others. At the end of the pilgrimage, pilgrims often like to share their experiences—typically they seek out reunions where those experiences can be recalled in the presence of those to whom they were bound by the bonds of common

[125] Ibid., 249–50.

purpose of the pilgrimage. From those experiences, they have attained pleasure. As we demonstrate later, the joy and pleasure that pilgrims attain lasts longer than many other kinds of pleasure derived from normal touristic activities. This pleasure does not just lay on a physical level but is elevated to and rooted in the spiritual level. As Pope Benedict XVI states, the Christian faith is similar to the notion of pilgrimage, "of being always on a journey… allow oneself to be changed, to move forward.… The destiny of the pilgrim, who never quite settle down, but belongs to a wider sphere."[126] They share their pleasure because they might have experienced the supreme pleasure in the contemplation of God. Precisely, praying and worshipping brings pilgrims to move from the physical center towards the spiritual center from which the true spiritual pleasure can be received.

We conclude that a physical center is always correlative with a sacred site. Christian pilgrims embark on a journey to a physical center at which they seek an exalted experience because the physical journey, by virtue of their intentionality, is also a spiritual journey. They arrive at the spiritual center by embarking on a spiritual journey, which is intimately interconnected with the physical journey to the physical center. Upon arriving at the spiritual center, pilgrims experience a natural sense of pleasure and, that moment of pleasure, because it is both physical and spiritual, dwells in the pilgrims' heart and makes them keep longing for this pleasure in recollections after the pilgrimage.

We have briefly presented the two elements of Christian pilgrimage within the natural attitude. The intentionalities of Christian pilgrims highly correlate with their spiritual and physical journeys and centers; they are

[126] Joseph Ratzinger, *Faith and the Future* (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1971), 46.

mutually co-presented and co-dependent. The subjective perceptions of pilgrims are evidences in the natural attitude, which must be the starting viewpoint for the phenomenological analysis. This cannot be undertaken without the beliefs in the natural attitude and pilgrims' intentionalities.[127] We, however, need to transition from the natural attitude to the phenomenological attitude of Christian pilgrimage if we are to understand further and deeper the underlying phenomenon. Therefore, we put all these intentionalities into brackets together with the idea of pilgrimage itself. That is to say, we will examine whether there are elements that we can detach from these phenomena as non-essential, in favor of moving towards and gaining a deeper transcendental understanding of pilgrimage.

First of all, we examine the element of 'journey' in a phenomenological attitude. Since, compared with making a pilgrimage under the penitential system in the Medieval era, setting out on a pilgrimage is more accessible today; then how does the journey towards the sacred sites become meaningful, becomes more than simply a tourist-trip?

The Christian pilgrim typically has an anticipation of the journey grounded in an objective situated beyond their present situation: they might aim for a better understanding of the beliefs of their religion, to seek out the value of life through their journey, to embark on a spiritual reflection or retreat, or to look for a solution of what has been puzzling for long during the pilgrimage in which their faith might be deepened and become more mature. Among all these anticipatory intentionalities, pilgrims anticipate or project themselves into the future in different ways, into the imagination of pilgrimage. This anticipatory form of imagination does not merely let one's

[127] Sokolowski, *Introduction to Phenomenology,* 63.

fantasy fly, but, as Sokolowski argues, is deliberately aimed at bringing the subject back to the earth.[128] When pilgrims are on the way to their destination, they intend to anticipate what they can 'reap' during the pilgrimage(which is not the primary motivation of pilgrimage). Because no matter how intense pilgrims fantasize concerning their anticipations of pilgrimage, the identity of the pilgrimage remains in force. That is, the identity of Christian pilgrimage as making a journey to the center from which pilgrims seek to have an encounter with God.

The anticipation of the absent thing is called *empty intention*. It is empty because it is about to be filled. When pilgrims have an anticipation of the journey to Jerusalem or to Compostela, they perceive the journey as an empty intention; until they arrive this empty intention will not be filled up. Regarding the element of the journey, the emphasis is either on the arrival at the sacred sites or on the way to the destination. Speaking of the former, its anticipation will be fulfilled whenever pilgrims arrive at the physical center where the theophany had occurred. For the latter, they might fulfill their anticipation by arriving at the spiritual center at which the hierophany, the encounter with God will be made present. Hence, the journey becomes transcendental under the phenomenological analysis. When the empty intention during the anticipation of the journey becomes fulfilled in the presence, the anticipation of the journey no longer means just going to a foreign place (which, as we have seen, is the original meaning of pilgrimage etymologically). The anticipation of the journey towards a sacred site turns into being a pilgrimage towards one's spirituality; pilgrims perceive a journey shifting into a pilgrimage because the theophany or hierophany are part of the journey that fulfills their empty intention. The

[128] Ibid., 72.

anticipatory intentionality of Christian pilgrimage accounts for how pilgrims displace themselves from a typical journey into the realm of pilgrimage. A journey no longer appears itself a general journey but as a pilgrimage from which Christian pilgrims find the encounter with God.

After the analysis of the element of 'journey', when pilgrims arrive at the center, how does the center, *axis mundi*, appear itself to pilgrims? Also, the center manifests itself in manifolds. Among these various manifestations, we manage to examine the identity of Christian pilgrimage.

Guided by Eliade's notion of center, we have already presented two different kinds of 'centers': the physical and the spiritual center. Further, the Turners' idea of *liminality* as a transient phase during the pilgrimage offers a lens to understand the attributes of pilgrimage more accurately. In their book, they use Arnold van Gennep's structure of successive phases—separation, limen, and aggregation—to dimensionalize the whole of pilgrimage.[129] In accordance with the notion of center, the liminal phase of the Turners corresponds with Eliade's center. In the phenomenological attitude, however, we may ask how the perception of the liminal phase makes an individual or a group travel from a mundane periphery to a sacred center, which is understood as *axis mundi* of one's faith.[130]

First, we focus on the experience of pilgrims entering into the aedicule in the Holy Sepulcher. Looking at the exalted feeling, perhaps, when pilgrims imagine or place themselves into the scenario that has happened at that sacred site, it gives pilgrims a different perception and

[129] Turner and Turner, *Image and Pilgrimage in Christian Culture,* 2.

[130] Ibid., 34.

understanding than what pilgrims might experience in their homeland. Because the phenomenon of entering into the aedicule enables the imaginative or the empty intention of the aedicule to become fulfilled, it is this fulfillment that conveys an exaltation of the change that is the elevation from the level of intellectual understanding into a spiritual-practical realization. Moreover, this realization can be considered as the liminal phase of the pilgrimage, because it happens upon the aedicule, which is regarded as the center, the *axis mundi*. The Christian knows where his faith originates and how essential the resurrection is for it. Furthermore, the reason why he or she becomes a Christian or adheres to Christian faith, might not be solely or primarily oriented by the intellectual understanding of the resurrection; instead, it might be a pure intuition of knowing the man called Jesus of Nazareth, the Christ, who has risen from the dead. Alternatively, Jesus might be the one whom the Christian would lean on when troubles come. Gradually, the Christian begins to desire to know and flourish in their faith more, in other words, to get to know Jesus even more. Prior to his departure from home and during the journey, the pilgrim may have various ideas, even imaginative ones, of what he might attain at the center. After arriving at the center, praying and worshipping at the aedicule, this intention becomes realized in his consciousness of the event in the life of the man in whom he believes: from 'knowing' Jesus from written sources, he now knows him now by way of a personal experience that brings along a different, 'real' dimension to it. From the intuition at the very first beginning of knowing Jesus by means of catechism classes or biblical knowledge, now, at this liminal moment, he knows Jesus by an encounter at the spiritual center.

The same phenomenon presents us with three different intentionalities: the perception of the center as an historical event, as intellectual knowledge, and as an encounter. Pilgrimage, as a mediation, enables one to experience the various manifestations of the center through these intentionalities. Essentially, arriving at the center, the liminal phase is the 'climax' of pilgrimage from which Christian pilgrims have a transcendent experience of encounter with Jesus. The perception of the resurrection of Jesus becomes an encounter-experience enabled by making a pilgrimage to the center. In this analysis, pilgrims have been changed existentially by the encounter. They remain the same in essence but, in the sense of existence or identity, as being a Christian, he or she has been changed.

We can differentiate three different senses of being a pilgrim corresponding to the three different time periods: before, during, and after the pilgrimage. The encounter with Jesus is evoked by the change of experiences during the pilgrimage understood as the liminal phase. In the phenomenological attitude, this change of oneself pertains to another phenomenon of pilgrimage: that of remembering. For "remembering is not the perception of an image but a revival of a perception."[131] The pilgrim has a memory of what he or she has perceived of the same event during the pilgrimage. One might have a consciousness of the memory that the encounter with God occurred at the center before, this intentional act brings a revival of the perception of the encounter again, from which one realizes that the memory, despite often being deceptive, does not mean that it does not exist. Because it exists, the subject can reflect on it, experience a new manifold (in the sense of 'realities in manifold' used by Sokolowski) of the same event, gain access to a new level of understanding of what has been

[131] Sokolowski, *Introduction to Phenomenology,* 69.

believed for a long time. Thus, the phenomenon of comparing the memory and the actual realization in the encounter evokes the feeling of exaltation and thereby makes the pilgrim change.

Second, we can consider pilgrimage in a manner that emphasizes the way rather than the destination. We have examined the experience of a pilgrim to the Holy Land entering into the aedicule, by looking at pilgrims' anticipation, perception, and remembering. These perceptions are informed and effected by the liminality and *communitas*, and the key condition for the occurrence of these is the context of the whole pilgrimage understood as rite of passage. However, when we observe, by way of the example of Loyola's Way, there is a difference compared to the Holy Land pilgrimage, even though similar intentionalities might be involved. The difference is that, whereas *communitas* is a primary condition in the case of the Holy Land pilgrimage, contrariwise, the pilgrimage on Loyola's Way one undertakes is an essentially individual journey, one that is no longer restricted to the experience or set within the context of *communitas*. The Turners refer to such a journey as a 'liminoid' phenomenon, which is "not conceptualized within a religious system."[132] That is to say, any individual can jump into the liminal phase without an experience of *communitas*. It mainly describes the status of a pilgrim as an individual, who breaks through or out of her existing social status into that of being primarily a pilgrim during the pilgrimage.

Nevertheless, the perceptions that are given to us of Loyola's Way or of the Pilgrimage into the Holy Land are neither merely identified through liminoid nor liminal experience. They exist together and are co-presented

[132] Turner and Turner, *Image and Pilgrimage in Christian Culture,* 34–35, 253.

during the pilgrimage. They both entail a spiritual and physical journey at once. Hence, from the phenomenological viewpoint, an individual pilgrim, who would have imagination, memory and anticipation during the pilgrimage, is similar to those who emphasize the liminal phase and communitas: both aim at an encounter with God. Two sets of anticipation, perception, and remembering would distinguish these two kinds of Christian pilgrimage. What to do for an individual pilgrim going to Compostela is not necessarily corresponding with the historical, geographical, and archeological facts of the bible. Likewise, one's personal spiritual reflection might generate an experience of pilgrimage. Either liminal or liminoid phases can trigger a pilgrim to experience an encounter with God.

After looking at the two kinds of centers in the phenomenological attitude, we gain new manifolds—of anticipation, perception, and remembering a Christian pilgrimage. Nonetheless, the identity of a Christian pilgrimage consists in the encounter with Jesus. Therefore, the identity of a pilgrimage is given through its variant appearances; namely, the encounter goes beyond its ways of being given. We can see how the pilgrims anticipate the pilgrimage before they set out, observe how pilgrims fulfill their empty intentions upon arriving at the sacred sites, but we cannot identify the encounter with the sum of its appearances until we reflect on those manifolds. Therefore, the identity gives us a transcendental understanding of the Christian pilgrimage which consists in the encounter with God. Some might ask: what do pilgrims get to know during this encounter? Why do pilgrims long for it? Does the identity make a Christian pilgrimage to differ compared to other pilgrimages? In order to answer these questions, we need to scrutinize the third element of pilgrimage: the quests for meaning.

In the case of a Christian pilgrimage, the Christian pilgrim intends to seek out what is man's happiness. As Claussen argues, quoting Augustine's City of God, "*Peregrinatio* (pilgrimage) is the essential activity (and being a *peregrinus* [pilgrim] the essential characteristic) of the citizens of the city of God who dwell on earth." For "the *civitas Dei* on earth as *peregrine* (pilgrims)," making a pilgrimage toward God is the most identified activity, which shows the identity of being one of the *civitas Dei*. Moreover, the celestial city' which they would inhabit is the place where they can 'live'[133] with God. Furthermore, 'living' with God renders the most self-sufficient joy or pleasure since it is true pleasure for its own sake; no further ends shall be pursued. Thus, pilgrims are urged to arrive and stay at the place where they can find true happiness.[134] In a general interpretation of pilgrimage, those who are seeking meaning during the pilgrimage might desire to understand about archeological or historical facts, as well as cultural customs. For Christian pilgrimage, being a *peregrinus* in this Augustinian sense, he might have obtained such understandings, but at a deeper level, the pilgrim may desire to 'live' momentarily the life of the city of God on earth in order to know what happiness is.

The pleasurable moment appears when a pilgrim experiences an encounter with Jesus. The pilgrim, who has had an encounter with Jesus during the pilgrimage, might find himself in nostalgia that makes him remember the pleasurable moment after he returns to his homeland. When pilgrims recall this unique experiences of their pilgrimage, they are having a consciousness of the memory of that event. Within the phenomenological attitude, regarding memory, what happens in remembering is that pilgrims

[133] M.A. Claussen, *"'Peregrinatio'* and *'Peregrini'* in Augustine's *'City of God,'" Traditio* 46 (1991): 44.

[134] In book XIX, by using a philosophical way, Augustine depicts that man is desire to pursue the happiness for the own sake.

revive the pleasurable moment after returning home from the pilgrimage. To remember the pleasurable moment is placing oneself back into the pure contemplation of God that is at the heart of the pleasure derived from the encounter. Sokolowski argues that this remembering is not just an act of picturing an image of something, but accurately pilgrims experience of having a consciousness of what has actually happened back then, where and when during the pilgrimage and from which happening the pilgrim derived the pleasurable moment.[135] Moreover, such a pleasurable moment occurs when the pilgrim is in the liminal phase. Through remembering what has occurred during the liminal phase, a pilgrim is, in the Turners' terminology, in 'reaggregation'. He reaggregates into the encounter with God because he finds what true happiness is in this very encounter. From it, the pilgrim receives a sense of deep joy and pleasure, one that goes beyond touristic pleasure, because this pleasure is ultimately about the pilgrim's faith and finding true meaning in life; it is the foretasted activity of living in the City of God of St. Augustine's conception, namely, it is the taste and contemplation of God himself, seeing and encountering only each other: man seeing God only and God seeing man only. This joy and pleasure also provoke a pilgrim to reminisce about the experience of the encounter and so relive it. Thus, reliving the pleasurable moment is re-experiencing the encounter, to originate happiness.

If the phenomenon of remembering is not just picturing but letting oneself revive the experience from which the memory is derived, one might reasonably long to pursue it. The pilgrim, after returning to his normal social context, would desire to continue his pilgrimage and would indulge in the prayer and worship, on which pilgrim concentrated during the pilgrimage.

[135] Sokolowski, *Introduction to Phenomenology*, 68–70.

Eric Cohen describes this phenomenon as one of being an 'exile'.[136] After a pilgrim has been to the center, from which he seeks out to understand what true happiness is, he longs to live in the happy moments he experiences and from which he now lives as an 'exile' from the center where he had grasped a glimpse of that happiness. Thus, from this phenomenological analysis of reminiscing about the encounter, we might allow the identity of Christian pilgrimage to reach a transcendental understanding, that means, of a spiritual journey inwards with the object of knowing and pursuing true happiness. We may doubt whether pleasure is not identical to happiness, they are, however, intensely linked together. These concepts are treated by Aristotle in his *Nicomachean Ethics (EN)* and by understanding his account, we will come to understand the whole of the phenomenon of Christian pilgrimage more fully.

Aristotle rejects both the notion of pleasure in extreme hedonist and anti-hedonist terms. In book VII of *EN*, he argues against the position that pleasure is not a good at all. Later, in book X chapter 2, he disagrees that pleasure is the good. He draws out his viewpoint of pleasure both in book VII chapter 12 &13 and X chapter 4: 1) pleasure is not a process which is an incomplete activity because every process takes time to achieve its form; instead, a pleasurable moment does not take time to make it complete, it is complete by itself, all at once. Therefore, pleasure is a complete activity.[137] 2). Essentially, Aristotle gives two senses of 'complete': 'complete in form' and 'complete as perfect'.[138] For the first point, an example from the matter under consideration here, 'pilgrimage', we can say that the activity of

[136] Cohen, "A Phenomenology of Tourist Experiences," 191.

[137] Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, ed. Terence Irwin, 2nd ed. (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Pub. Co, 1999),1153a 10, 1174a 14.

[138] David Bostock, "Pleasure and Activity in Aristotle's Ethics," *Phronesis* 33, no. 1–3 (1988): 258, accessed March 20, 2020, https://doi.org/10.1163/156852888X00199.

making a pilgrimage is complete whenever the pilgrim arrives at the center. Because the actualization of making a pilgrimage is an arrival at the center. Further, the pilgrim finds the pleasure and joy of the pilgrimage at the center, a joy leading towards the encounter with God. When the pilgrimage is going toward the center, the pilgrim cannot find the same pleasure as is to be had in having an encounter, so that it is still incomplete. In the second meaning of 'complete', Aristotle states that "the most pleasant activity is the most complete,"[139] so that pleasure completes an activity by being a consequent end of it. That is to say, pleasure 'perfects' or fulfills a capacity of an activity ordered toward pleasure. To distinguish it from the first meaning of 'complete', pleasure, at this point, is an extra good added to the good end from the complete activity. A 'consequent' end is different from the actualization of the activity itself. So, we conclude with Kraut, from Aristotle's analysis, that pleasure, by its nature, "is an activity that accompanies other activities, and in some sense brings them to completion."[140] Pleasure is a complete activity that does not aim at other goals. Pleasure, by its existence, completes the activity as a by-product of that completion.

However, Aristotle argues that pleasures differ in kind, "each kind of animal seems to have its own proper pleasure, just as it has its own proper function. Since he assumes that human beings desire to live well and achieve the highest good,[141] Aristotle claims, therefore that, some pleasures are good although not everyone would choose them. Even though choosing the 'best' pleasure is a rational activity, it is also vital to choose to be virtuous. If humans do only what is pleasurable, the result he contends, could not be

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[139] Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics,* 1174b 22.

[140] Richard Kraut, "Aristotle's Ethics," *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Summer 2018 Edition) 2018, accessed May 20, 2020, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2018/entries/aristotle-ethics/.

[141] Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 1094a 1−4.

good. Thus, Aristotle again proposes his definition of happiness: happiness is an activity of the soul in accord with virtue.[142] Because the rational power is the capacity that distinguishes the human being from the other non-human animal beings, and, if pleasure completes activity, then the activity of the soul is relevant to the rational power of human beings. This pleasure then corresponds to rational activity, namely, the pleasure of knowing. For Aristotle, living well, happiness is the final goal of a human being's activities.

Concerning Christian pilgrimage, does the encounter give meaning to what happiness is for a Christian? Phenomenologically, if the encounter manifests itself as light that shines upon the meaning of happiness, how does a Christian perceive the encounter as the manifestation that leads to the meaning of the highest good that human beings would desire? As we have examined, pleasure (in Greek, *hedone*) is not identical to happiness. The word 'happiness' in Greek is eudaimonia which means 'good spirit' or 'good energy'. When Aristotle discusses the details of eudaimonia, however, the definition of happiness comes out in another way. In Book I Cp. 7, he sets an account of the human good and proves that the most excellent good is happiness which stretches over the whole lifetime of a person. Next, he asserts that happiness is an activity of the soul: humans desire to choose the good because this is according to the human function.[143] The function of being human differs from that of other animals because a human being has the ability to reason, and this capacity is because human beings have a human soul. Thus, Aristotle states that "the human function is the activity of the soul in accord with reason or requiring reason."[144] Further, he claims that

[142] Ibid., 1098a 18.

[143] Ibid., 1098a 2.

[144] Ibid., 1098a 7.

the best human function is the ultimate end; it is the most complete activity;[145] it is self-sufficient;[146] it is the most choice-worthy.[147] In addition, this activity does not merely remain at the level of understanding but performs it practically. Therefore, happiness comes with virtue.

Then what is virtue for Aristotle? Why do we need to practice virtue in order to live well? Virtue, *arete* in Greek, means 'excellence', in Aristotle's account. In order to live well or achieve *eudaimonia*, Aristotle said that it means one ought to live as a good or excellent person. Lawrence Hatab comments that, in the *Nichomachaean Ethics*, "Aristotle does not pursue metaethical questions" such as whether ethics can be justified, but rather "how one should be ethical."[148] What Hatab suggests is that virtue does not come along at the level of knowledge, instead it should be practiced with the doctrine of 'mean' and virtue develops into a habitual disposition (*hexis*).[149]

In Aristotle's conception, there are both character virtues and intellectual virtues. Each occupies the middle ground, the mean between the two extreme conditions of excess and deficiency.[150] Thus, being a virtuous person means aiming to know what is the good and perform it properly as a habit in daily life. Furthermore, we can conclude eudaimonia is, as Hatab remarks "a comprehensive and ongoing achievement, not a 'state of mind.'"[151] For it is true that happiness, in Aristotle's account, does not merely refer to a subjective mental state of feeling happy or blessed, rather,

[145] Ibid., 1097b 5.

[146] Ibid., 1176b 7.

[147] Ibid., 1176b 28.

[148] Kevin Hermberg and Paul Gyllenhammer, *Phenomenology and Virtue Ethics*, Issues in Phenomenology and Hermeneutics (London; New York: Bloomsbury, 2013), 14.

[149] Ibid., 15.

[150] Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 1104a 25.

[151] Ibid., 15.

it is a life-long process or life-style that requires virtuous activities to achieve or arrive at it. Eudaimonia is thus often translated as human flourishing in the context of a life-long project.

Since happiness is self-sufficient and the most choice-worthy activity, because it does not aim at any goals apart from or beyond itself, this means that those who are doing fine, and excellent actions are enjoying a happiness.[152] Aristotle does not deny that pleasure is *a* good. Essentially, he specifies the types of pleasure and recognizes the value of pleasure as depending on the value of the corresponding activity. Therefore, since the good of pleasure should not be separated from virtue, and happiness is thus inextricably linked with virtuous activity, we may ask what types of activity give supreme pleasure under this analysis?

At the beginning of Book X Cp.7, Aristotle states that "it is reasonable for it (happiness) to accord with the supreme virtue, which will be the virtue of the best thing." Next, he further claims that "the best (activity) is understanding … to understand what is fine and divine."[153] The reason, he suggests, that one is concerned about the divine is that one believes the divine is unchanging, and never passes from capacity to activity: humans do change from the one status to the other over time,[154] while the divine is always in an activity that is 'study'. The word 'study' in Greek is *theorein*, and *theoria* is the noun form of this word, often translated as 'contemplation'. In Aristotle's account, 'study', *theorein*, does not mean to engage discursively in rational thought; but instead to the activity of the capacity of understanding by gazing fully on what appears. Because human happiness

[152] Ibid., book X Cp. 6 Part 3.

[153] Ibid., 1177a 13−16.

[154] Ibid., 1154b 26.

consists in the complete fulfillment of the human function,[155] its fulfillment lies in the rational understanding as the highest end, by the pure intellectual activity of contemplative study. Besides, this activity, for Aristotle, is the most godlike activity[156] because the gods "are rational beings with no need to apply reason to practice,"[157] and contemplative study is an activity that knows things with a clear view.

Aristotle further notes that, however, contemplative study is not the complete good for a human being: we still need to practice other virtues of character for the sake of the good of the whole of human being and society.[158]

In other words, happiness is not a process and a mere mental state. It is the complete activity of the soul in accord with virtue as an end that does not call for any other end. Contemplative study (*theoria*) is the human activity that meets all the criteria of happiness. It is, as we have said, most self-sufficient, most choice-worthy, and aims at no end beyond itself.[159] Further, this is the ideal for our pursuit of happiness in the Aristotelian sense.[160] For no one tries to live well in order to attain other goals, other than theorein. Therefore, contemplative study becomes the supreme activity leading to the highest form of experiencing happiness.

It can be argued that when a Christian pilgrim has an encounter with God, contemplation of God is the activity corresponding to the notion of

[155] Ibid., xxii.

[156] Ibid., 1178b 24.

[157] Ibid., xxiii.

[158] Ibid., 1178b 5−9.

[159] Ibid., book X Cp. 3−5.

[160] Ibid., 1177b 26.

theoria. Praying and worshipping bring one into the vision of the encounter with God. At that moment, pilgrims delve themselves into the joy and pleasure that is provoked by the encounter. One might disregard what is happening around him and pays all attention to the vision. Nightingale claims, based on Aristotle (*Protrepticus*), "The philosophic *theoros* (who acts *theoria*), contemplates 'the nature of truth and reality', pursuing this as an end in itself rather than for goal-oriented, utilitarian purposes."[161] As it happens, because the activity of contemplative study intends to gaze on a vision, so, to contemplate God is to grasp the vision of God. The pilgrim might gain a glimpse of the vision of contemplation of God. This glimpse aims at no further end, for it is the good in itself. Further, where the encounter happens it is the 'destination' of the pilgrimage, and the destiny of Christian life is 'to be with Jesus'.[162] Coincidentally, the encounter as the 'destination' offers a glimpse of 'to be with Jesus', as the destiny of Christian life. Therefore, contemplation is to know God by the vision which is that moment of vividly seeing Him face to face and it is the good that a Christian desires: it is the most sufficient, choice-worthy, and pleasurable activity. Augustine, analogously, reveals that the place where one can dwell with the same pleasure that one has during the encounter with God is in the 'City of God'.

In the phenomenological attitude, each time a pilgrim 'revives' the overwhelming moment of the encounter, the appetite of staying in the contemplation of God is evoked. It has been mentioned that the phenomenon of remembering is not identified with picturing. For the pilgrim who has experienced the vision of God, one might also have enjoyed the pleasure of reviving the moment of that contemplation. When one

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[161] Nightingale, "The Philosopher at the Festival," 154.

[162] See Luke 23:42, Jesus promised his Kingdom to the good thief.

remembers it, one also puts oneself into the past, the encounter. "This displacement of myself into the past introduces a whole new dimension into my mental or inner life. I am not confined to the here and now; I can not only refer to the past (and to the future, as we shall see), but I can also live in it through memory."[163] Hence the self, before, during and after, the pilgrimage has been changed existentially by the contemplation of God. The pilgrim might realize that the capacity of vision of God is actualized by the activity of *theoria* of a man but not by the power of discursive thought. When one revives the experience, one re-contemplates the vision of God and, at the same time, re-contemplates the self that was entirely indulging in the joy of being in *eudaimonia*. The phenomenon of remembering is the revival of one's earlier perception, and this revival evokes a revival of the self in the past as well. Consequently, if being in *eudaimonia* is required for understanding, then, understanding God, as *theorein*, the vision of God is the best understanding of happiness for the Christian. Pilgrims will remember the experience of the encounter when they return to their social status *quo ante*, but there is an existential change in that they now seek to live virtuously with the goal that will lead them to that remembered foretaste of *eudaimonia*.

If the contemplation of God is an integral part of being in *eudaimonia*, it seems logically possible to continuously live well by mere contemplation. However, humans are also active beings, so how can a human perfectly live well in the sense of perfection as a completed act? How should pilgrims continue to live well after grasping a glimpse of the pleasure of happiness?

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[163] Sokolowski, *Introduction to Phenomenology*, 70.

Thomas Aquinas complements and builds upon Aristotle's account of happiness in his *Summa Theologiae* (ST) and the *Summa Contra Gentiles* (SCG), and, in so doing, sets out a more explicit goal. First, he recognizes that happiness is a human person's ultimate end.[164] Second, in SCG, part III, Cp. 37 & 48, he clarifies that human happiness understood as *felicitas* is created, with which concept he identified Aristotle's eudaimonia. A human person's ultimate end is the perfect happiness *beatitudo*, which is uncreated. By this he means that human persons could not entirely achieve happiness as *beatitude* in this earthly life.[165] Also, Sullivan quotes Boethius (*De consolatione philosophiae*, II, 4: 80; see III, 9: 80- 85) saying that "*Felicitas*, an earthly temporal good, and *beatitudo*, 'the highest good of a rational nature.'"[166] For the sake of accessing perfect happiness, a human person cannot attain it (*beatitudo*), since contemplation cannot become the only and uninterrupted activity in an earthly life, Aquinas further explains that in the present life, in so far as we fall short of the unity and continuity of that operation, so do we fall short of perfect happiness.[167] Nevertheless, achievable human happiness, *felicitas*, is a participation in happiness as *beatitudo*.[168] What the pilgrim has grasped during the encounter, in Aquinas's notion, is the vision of *beatitudo (beatific vision* in SCG III Cp. 3), which is perfect happiness. Even though one is not able to achieve the perfect happiness on earth, one can still partake or share in that perfect happiness as long as the

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[164] *Thomas, Summa Theologiae*, I−II, q. 1, a. 8, in Vol. 15: *Prima Secundae*, 1-70, ed. John Mortensen and Enrique Alarcón, trans. Fr Laurence Shapcote (Lander, WY: The Aquinas Institute, 2012). *Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles*: Providence, Part I (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1991).

[165] ST, I−II, 3, 1.

[166] Ezra Sullivan, O.P. "Happiness," *Dictionary of Thomas Aquinas*, accessed June 27, 2020, https://www.academia.edu/38727240/HAPPINESS.

[167] ST, I−II, 3, 2.

[168] See n. 167.

happiness (*felicitas*), the pleasure is a proper accident resulting from perfect happiness.[169]

Furthermore, the intellectual faculty makes its demands upon the operations of the senses. As Aristotle claims that happiness is relevant to the activity of the soul because the soul gives human reasoning power, then happiness is the attainment of the last end which does not operate in the human intellective act of will because the act of will directs us to the end which is *beatitudo*.[170] If happiness consists of the operation of the act of will, it will be complete whenever the act of will is gone. However, the attainment of the end is not complete when desires are gone. The will is a movement towards the end. Here, Aquinas is making the same point as Aristotle's in understanding that pleasure is not identical to happiness, because even though the feeling of pleasure disappears, happiness can still be there. Therefore, Happiness consists in an operation of the speculative faculty. Given that the pilgrim desires to be in eudaimonia, and the desire does not disappear whenever the pilgrim has 'tasted' what it is, on the contrary, the pilgrim might only know what the *beatitudo* is after the encounter, and therefore seek to live a virtuous life as being *felicitas*. Hence the contemplation of God during a Christian pilgrimage can be correlated with Aristotle's notion of *theoria*. That is to say, the content of contemplative study for the Christian is the contemplation of God and, specifically, pilgrimage has the capacity to provoke in pilgrims that contemplation.

As shown earlier, to have an understanding of happiness is to give Christian pilgrimage a transcendental understanding. First, since grasping

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[169] ST, I−II, 2, 6.

[170] ST, I−II, 3, 4.

and contemplating the vision of God is the climax of a Christian pilgrimage, this contemplation occurs while the pilgrim experiences the encounter with the divine at the center. Given the Aristotelian and Thomistic ideas outlined above, we can say that the pleasure of contemplation results from perfect happiness. The pilgrim might remember this pleasure and so centralizes the pursuit of it over other pleasures, such as the pleasure obtained from wealth, honor, power, or any created good. It does not mean that the pilgrim will abandon all other kinds of pleasure and lives a restricted ascetic life after the pilgrimage, but that, instead, the pilgrim would treat those pleasures as to be pursued only at a moderate level.

Second, except for the new understanding of the pleasure derived from making a pilgrimage, it is pivotal to see how *beatitudo* and *eudaimonia* disclose the identity of Christian pilgrimage and give it a new understanding. Aquinas claims that contemplation is participation in perfect happiness, *beatitudo*.[171] Consequently, with this phenomenon, pilgrims anticipate *beatitudo* because they long for it. They remember it because they have experienced *beatitudo*. They choose to live a better life (*felicitas*) because *beatitudo* enlightens the ultimate happiest end in which Christians believe. Hence, *beatitudo* orients pilgrims to *eudaimonia*, and contemplation of God becomes the activity closest to *beatitudo* that a Christian can undertake in the earthly life. What Aristotle and Aquinas add to the understanding of pilgrimage is this profound perspective on the good human life from which the phenomenon of Christian pilgrimage as a journey in which pilgrims seek the meaning of good life can be understood.

[171] ST, I–II, 3, 7.

The transcendental understanding of Christian pilgrimage offers us a 'magnifier' to see the unreflective experience of Christian pilgrimage after the *epoché* and reduction. Sokolowski notes that "truth is achieved before philosophy comes on the scene."[172] This passage signifies that it is important to return to see how pilgrims commonly perceive pilgrimages. Further, "It (phenomenology) looks at 'human' being as the place in the world where truth occurs."[173] Accordingly, pilgrims should be the agent of the 'truth' of pilgrimage, and all further understandings should also rely on pilgrims' experiences. Therefore, the pilgrim stands as an agent of the empirical experience of pilgrimage and a transcendental understanding of pilgrimage. One could not abandon any of them; instead, under the 'light' of the philosophical understanding of happiness by predecessors, one can exercise those understandings of the various experiences of pilgrimage with a natural attitude. We do not abandon the empirical and transcendental experiences of pilgrimage, because a pilgrim is the dative or agent on which the truth of pilgrimage manifests. To understand this manifestation a pilgrim does not merely need to engage at the level of consciousness but starts from the empirical experiences. However, the understanding of happiness as a light shines out of the transcendental understanding, that is pilgrim's consciousness of pilgrimage—the intentionality of pilgrimage. This understanding of intentionality, following Husserl's thought, is the certain knowledge of things, *zu den Sachen selbst* ("the shore of phenomenology").[174]

It has been illustrated that journey, center, and a quest for meaning are the three key elements of pilgrimage. Speaking of Christian pilgrimage, in the natural attitude, one experiences Christian pilgrimage as a journey

[172] Sokolowski, *Introduction to Phenomenology,* 63.

[173] Ibid., 65.

[174] See n. 20.

motivated by faith. One supposes where the sacred places that Christians long to go are instituted by virtue of tradition or authority. It can be assumed that Christians go on a pilgrimage in order to seek out something. Furthermore, individual Christians go on a spiritual pilgrimage and arrive at a spiritual center. More and more aspects of pilgrimage as phenomena thus appear. Moreover, because Christian pilgrimage is a religious pilgrimage, it also corresponds phenomenologically with the phenomena of religious pilgrimage as the description of its *parts and whole, identity* and *presence and absence*.

After these beliefs are 'suspended', the 'we' to whom the analysis of the suspension is given, can arrive at a transcendental understanding of pilgrimage. This understanding is to say that Christian pilgrims are looking for a glimpse of the perfect happiness, *beatitudo*. Further, pilgrimage as experience provides a vivid image of *beatitudo*, which enables us to know how to live well. For the person can know what the *beatitudo* or happiness is from any other source, but the pilgrimage makes the imagination and anticipation of *beatitudo* become an exalted, an overwhelmed, and a real experience. When pilgrims recall the memory of pilgrimage, they might recall the experience of the encounter with God. During the encounter, contemplating God is the only activity on which the pilgrim focuses. In addition, there, the pleasure comes along with contemplation, namely, the pleasure is the consequent end of the vision of the Divine essence in which the perfect happiness consists.[175] The pilgrim pursues this pleasure again after the pilgrimage, and one begins to pray and contemplate God, for pilgrims attempt to see the vision and enjoy the encounter again as they did during the pilgrimage. Pilgrimage itself functions as the mediation that deepens Christians' faith and enlarges their desire to contemplate God. The identity

[175] ST, I–II, 3, 8.

of religious pilgrimage as an encounter with the divine has been described and the encounter with Jesus in Christian pilgrimage is no longer just understood the goal of the journey, rather it is an activity that the Christian pilgrim desires to do for one's entire life.

Besides the phenomenon of remembering, the transcendental understanding gives us new knowledge on other phenomena in the natural attitude. When Erik Cohen places the nature of center at the heart of his analysis, he is concerned that tourists, conscious of the existential mode of their journey or pilgrim (for whom that consciousness can be assumed), might realize the inauthenticity of the center, in that it only symbolizes the pilgrim's ideal center, rather than the real center.[176] "Jerusalem may be the Holy City, but ordinary human life in Jerusalem is far from holy." He further claims that it is true that pilgrims anticipate what the center is before making a pilgrimage. However, the true center is the spiritual center by and towards which the Christian pilgrims are oriented. Referring to the Turners' concept of the state of the liminal, while making a pilgrimage deriving from a desire to seek one's spiritual root, this is a journey of seeking one's center, one's meaning of life: namely, the answer to the question "what I am being here?" The Christian pilgrim does not intend to perceive the citizen's life in Jerusalem but the citizen's life of the Heavenly Jerusalem. The pilgrim might have a consciousness of the center where they could figure out the meaning that gives the goal of life as being Christians in the world. Further, that is the type of pleasure which they know from the journey, compared with the perception of the ordinary life or culture in Jerusalem: the pleasure from the spiritual center is much more choice-worthy.

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[176] Cohen, "A Phenomenology of Tourist Experiences," 195.

It is impossible to grasp the whole of *beatitudo* in one's earthly life. Therefore, pilgrimage is a retreat withdrawing from the daily routine, which is peripheral, and the retreat generates a time-space in which one can delve oneself into the spiritual center, where one can find the true self: find the happiness. After all, the pilgrim returns to one's native society and culture. The pilgrim is led to continuously live well oriented toward *eudaimonia* by the experience at the center. Hence even the destination or center is still given to us as a sacred site or an ideal *axis mund*i, and one perceives it as the place where one can find the supreme pleasure. Because a pilgrimage to a sacred site as a retreat does not last forever, the pilgrim can, in effect, live in exile as a life-long pilgrimage of retreat, withdrawing from the earthly life toward the center in which the most choice-worthy pleasure is located.

Finally, to conclude the phenomenology of Christian pilgrimage in this section, we have a transition from the common beliefs of general religious pilgrimage into the phenomenological approach of the Christian pilgrimage. We used the method of transcendental reduction to analyze the three elements: journey, center, and a quest for meanings into the phenomenological attitude. Next, we drew a transcendental understanding of Christian pilgrimage informed by the notions of happiness by Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas. Essentially, we pulled this uncovered understanding, which is the pilgrims' consciousness of pilgrimage, into the empirical experiences of that happening in our naïve attitude. We conclude that, when we see that a pilgrim desires to have a pilgrimage, it is clear that Christian pilgrimage as a phenomenon appearing itself is not just a religion-oriented journey. Primarily, it is a mediating experience enabling one to find one's happiness. After the pilgrimage, the pilgrim might be seen, in some small measure, as devoting themselves to the Christian faith more than before.

Thus, pilgrimage considered as a retreat prompts one to seek out the true self, understood as a foreigner, a peregrinus dwelling in this world, and come pellegrin che tornar vuole ("like a pilgrim who wants to return").[177] This analysis of Christian pilgrimage enables the making of a phenomenological comparison with the contemporary secular pilgrimage. We will now examine what the commonalities and differences between two types of pilgrimage might be.

When we say something is secular, we mean that it is not religious, no longer religious or does not have any connections with religion. Pilgrimage, from the historical perspective, originates and connects with religious traditions and the manifestation of the divine. As we have mentioned above, in the section of the definition of pilgrimage, Collins-Kreiner suggests that "the difference between a traditional pilgrims and tourists will be fading,"[178] because whether tourists or pilgrims, it is hard to differentiate both effects of the visit on them after a journey.[179] Both will figure out some meaning in their lives. Further, Maddrell et al. claim that "The language of pilgrimage is increasingly being applied to other secular purposive journeys."[180] By way of analogy, the word 'bible' has come commonly to be used in a book's title, such as *The Restaurant Marketing Bible, The Barbecue Bible, The Small Business Bible, The Bible to Business Credit, etc.* The word bible used in the book's title does not refer to what the Christian religion signifies by the use of the term to mean the sacred Scriptures of that religion. Even though the word bible derives from Greek ta biblia, which is the plural of

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[177] Murray Bodo and Susan Saint Sing, *A Retreat with Francis and Clare of Assisi: Following Our Pilgrim Hearts,* A Retreat With-- Series (Cincinnati, OH: St. Anthony Messenger Press, 1996), 37.

[178] Collins-Kreiner, "Geographers and Pilgrimages," 445.

[179] Ibid., 446.

[180] Maddrell, Terry, and Gale, "'At Least Once in a Lifetime,'" 72.

biblios, book, in the secular sense, the authors so entitled do not intend to mean simply a book. Instead, the book authors present their books as a book of reliable guidance or authority in a particular area of knowledge. Speaking of pilgrimage in the same way, we need to ask whether the religious factors still resonate with pilgrimage in the contemporary tourism? Can we sensibly use the word pilgrimage for secular journeys, in an analogous way to how those authors of secular works use the word bible?

2.3 Secular Pilgrimage

Scholars have long discussed the similarities between pilgrims and tourists. Blom et al. quote MacCannell[181] and note that "(he) introduced pilgrimages in a tourism context and suggested that tourists are a modern form of pilgrims."[182] The problem is what is the motivation of undergoing an experience of pilgrimage in a modern secular or touristic form. Do tourists have a consciousness of seeking an encounter with the divine? Alternatively, historical interests, architectural wonders, and archeological facts might orient tourists to go to traditional pilgrimage sites. The former connotes a religious motivation, and the latter pertains to a secularized motivation. Further, a modern form of traveling signifies, in a narrow sense, that the destinations and the motivations have no specific religious affiliations or link to formal religious traditions.[183] Hence, when mass tourism makes pilgrimage more accessible than before, we begin to consider those who visit the sites of traditional pilgrimage with no religious affiliations as secular pilgrims.

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[181] Dean MacCannell, *The Tourist: A New Theory of the Leisure Class* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999).

[182] Thomas Blom, Mats Nilsson, and Xosé Santos, "The Way to Santiago beyond Santiago. Fisterra and the Pilgrimage's Post-Secular Meaning," *European Journal of Tourism Research* 12 (2016): 137.

[183] Reader, *Pilgrimage*, 100.

The first type of secular pilgrims we might consider is those who are going to sacred sites with no religious faith or not motivated by religious devotion. This type can be understood by Margry's analogy of whether the non-alcohol whiskey is still considered a whiskey, that we saw earlier. In the case of pilgrimage, religiosity in a pilgrimage equals alcohol in a whiskey. If tourists are a modern form of pilgrims, and they claim themselves to be undergoing a pilgrimage, then must they be religious? Margry further comments that one of the reasons we assume tourists become more similar to pilgrims is the research method frequently employed. Using a non-qualitatively based research method that aims to collect the data on the social, cultural, touristic aspects of a pilgrimage, provokes the difficulty of clarifying the distinction between pilgrimage in the strict sense and tourism, because the motives of pilgrims are hard to locate in the data of those aspects of a pilgrimage. "(the researchers) obscure the central religious or spiritual incentive for going on a pilgrimage,"[184] thus the shift in the understanding of certain types of tourism as secular pilgrimage might be caused by the research method. In other words, the term "secular pilgrimage" itself might dilute or ignore the degree of religiosity essential even to the wider use of the term in a manner that assists understanding. This dilution blurs the clarity between pilgrims and tourists.

The destination at which the second type of secular pilgrimage arrives is the entirely non-religious places. An example is the journey to Disneyland, the amusement park, understood as a secular pilgrimage. Alex Moore remarks that since Disneyland functions as a pilgrimage center at which people transit into a liminal phase, to visit Disneyland is to enter into

[184] Margry, "Whiskey and Pilgrimage: Clearing Up Commonalities," 244.

a ritual threshold.[185] This ritual threshold is the whole ludic experience inside the park. The Magic Kingdom stands as a liminal space where people find out the true castle that has been imagined since childhood. Moreover, this ludic or playful experience is similar to the exaltation experience of the encounter with the divine in the religious pilgrimage. It is an experience to make the imagination of characters, the castle and other fantasies come true. Hence, is this journey truly to be considered as a pilgrimage? Perhaps, the journey to visit Disneyland is a journey to the center where one can have a transcendent experience that one cannot attain in his ordinary place. For clarifying the character of this type of secular pilgrimage, Erik Cohen answers that "(traditional) pilgrimage, [is] a movement toward the Center, and travel, a movement toward the opposite direction, toward the Other."[186] The center refers to the notion of Eliade's axis mundi and the center of Christian pilgrimage to which pilgrims find some meanings out of religious devotion. While the direction of "Other" is toward a place where one can effortlessly fulfill one's ludic satisfactions and desires without the hinderances of social-moral order. He further claims that both are liminal, but there is a difference.[187] The second type of secular pilgrimage is one that seeks out a ludic pleasure at the center. Secular pilgrims also transit into the liminal phase. The center, however, makes the difference that Cohen claimed from the traditional pilgrimage to the secular pilgrimage. For traditional pilgrimage, pilgrims, after a pilgrimage, would relocate their center from a sacred place to the inner center from which they have found the goal of life or other existential changes. While the center for this type

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[185] Alexander Moore, "Walt Disney World: Bounded Ritual Space and the Playful Pilgrimage Center," *Anthropological Quarterly* 53, no. 4 (1980): 207–8, accessed April 10, 2020, https://doi.org/10.2307/3318104.

[186] Cohen, "Pilgrimage and Tourism," 50.

[187] Ibid., 51

of pilgrims still becomes peripheral, no matter how many times they have arrived there, the void of the accomplishment remains.

The reason is that the center of traditional pilgrimage tends to be concentric, while the center of secular pilgrimage tends to be excentric.[188] The ludic experience cannot be identical to the experience of religious pilgrimage. Even though both bring people into the liminal phase and trigger them to attain pleasure at the center, the pleasure or the meaning that they attain is different. The pleasure from the concentric pilgrimage provokes pilgrims to become involved with the center, whereas the experience of Disneyland provokes a pleasure that keeps secular pilgrims at the peripheral to the center.

Is pleasure the distinction between the second type of secular pilgrimage with traditional pilgrimage? Knox and Hannam extend the notion of pilgrim into hedonistic tourism through analyzing the touristic practices in mass tourism. Being a hedonistic tourist is to be in search of pleasure only during the journey, such as heavy drinking, casual sex, and drug use.[189] Achieving self-improvement and fulfilling self-interest can, of course, both be regarded as a pursuit of pleasure, particularly when some modern hedonistic pilgrims' behaviors correspond to some touristic activities. Knox and Hannam claim that "pilgrimages based upon hedonistic behavior and the opportunity to behave in a similarly hedonistic style" can properly be called pilgrimages.[190] Certainly, pilgrims as traditionally understood might

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[188] Erik Cohen, "Pilgrimage Centers Concentric and Excentric," *Annals of Tourism Research* 19 (1992): 37.

[189] Dan Knox and Kevin Hannam, "Is Tourist a Secular Pilgrim or a Hedonist in Search of Pleasure?," *Tourism Recreation Research* 39, no. 2 (January 2014): 236.

[190] Ibid., 239.

enjoy some pleasure in the aspects of local culture, history and other social interests. However, this phenomenon does not diminish the pleasure originating in the faith devotion, nor are they the center towards which the journey is oriented. Perhaps, some may argue, the escapism of holiday is a faith for modern tourists,[191] or at least a close analogue of it, and so the hedonistic pleasure sought becomes a kind of center, despite its location in excess, and therefore, outside the Aristotelian notion of *eudaimonia* understood as a mean between excess and deprivation.

Epistemologically, it is hard to know and justify whether one is a pilgrim, a secular pilgrim, or a tourist simply by definitions. There is no doubt that the development of mass tourism and pilgrimage generates a continuum between both. However, if there were commonalities and differences between them both, we need to investigate them. Therefore, a phenomenological comparison will enable us to see the values of pilgrimage and secular pilgrimage.

[191] Margry, "Whiskey and Pilgrimage," 246.

2.4 Commonalities and Differences

Since Christian pilgrimage has been analyzed, in the next paragraphs, to make a comparison between Christian pilgrimage as a type of traditional pilgrimage and secular pilgrimage is preferable. First, we contrast the parts and whole and the presence and absence on the aspect of pleasure with both. Second, we scrutinize the phenomenon of remembering: pilgrims and tourists might remember the experiences during the journeys, does the memory provoke each become concentric or excentric to the center where they have been?

We have seen that one of the pleasures of Christian pilgrimage is the foretaste of *beatitudo*, the ultimate happiness, through an encounter with God. For those who travel without religious intent to the sites of traditional pilgrimage, which are religious, they find their pleasure by knowing historical or archeological facts, wondering at the architecture, or other cultural customs. For those who travel to non-religious sites, they may find pleasure in entertainment, recreations, and other activities referring primarily to bodily enjoyment. In the notion of *parts and whole*, pleasure should be a non-independent part of the whole of Christian pilgrimage and secular pilgrimage. That is to say, taking pleasure as an independent piece of the whole that we single out is problematic. Instead, pleasure is only a moment of the whole experience of a pilgrim or a tourist: the whole of pilgrimage or tourism ought to be more than just pleasure.

Christian pilgrimage is about the whole of a human being, and it is about how to live a good life, how to flourish in the Christian faith. Receiving pleasure from a pilgrimage is just a part of the pilgrimage: the pleasure

from a pilgrimage is a gift. It is a gift because to attain it is not just required human efforts, but also the providence of God. Meanwhile, the pleasure of a secular pilgrimage is a significant, perhaps the predominant segment of the whole. People who go on a secular pilgrimage find pleasures intendedly. The more effort one spends in seeking the pleasures during a secular pilgrimage, ideally the more pleasure one will achieve. The aim of the secular pilgrimage is concrete. It is something that can be grasped by senses. However, it is hard to say which is more essential than the other, because to attain different kinds of pleasure requires an understanding of and connection with a human person's intentionality. People in secular pilgrimage have the consciousness of attaining secular pleasure, and they will seek it during the journey. In the same way, a Christian receives the pleasure related to Christian faith. The pleasure ought to never become the whole of Christian pilgrimage because that kind of pleasure only comes by the encounter with God. In other words, the pleasure is the icing on the cake: for the secular pilgrim the pleasure is the cake itself.

Pleasure stands as a goal, even the goal, on secular pilgrimage. Attaining pleasure at the center is considered as a goal that secular pilgrims intend to complete. When the absence of their intention becomes present, pleasure follows, for example arriving at a place where one longs to visit, being presented by historical architecture, or throwing oneself into an entertainment experience, such as playing in Disneyland. All pleasures become presence from absence while arriving at the center. Therefore, even though attaining pleasure occurs in both journeys, the difference is when we observe them in the light of people's intentionality, they are clearly different kinds of pleasure.

Second, both journeys function as liminal experiences. People would remember them after a pilgrimage. For Christian pilgrimage we have seen that what happens when Christian pilgrims remember, is that pilgrims relive the pleasurable moment after they are back from the pilgrimage and, in so doing, displace themselves back into the pure contemplation of God. They understand the meaning of what the good life is and grasp the vision of beatitudo at the center, which is an existential change in their life. Hence, to remember the liminal experiences is to reaggregate and relive them, and the center of a Christian pilgrim's life becomes concentric with the center where they had an encounter with God. That means the desire to go to the center no longer requires a physical pilgrimage, which jumps out from the original social status or preconceptions but can be lived as a life, like a pilgrimage, toward the (now spiritual) center within a concentric circle. For secular pilgrims, they might have tasted the value or the good of the liminal experiences and while they reminisce about those experiences, it is also the phenomenon of remembering. Secular pilgrims also relive their joyful experiences. However, those joyful experiences might not have or even be intended to have an existential impact upon them. When secular pilgrims relive those experiences, they might continue to desire to attain the same pleasure, but the only way to fulfill their desires is by arriving at the (physical) center again. Hence, they still live in a context excentric from the center where they found joyful experiences.

This brief comparison shows us that it is pivotal to connect the traditional and secular pilgrimages themselves with pilgrims' experience, from which, it is possible to seek out the commonalities: both travel from one place to another place; both travelers enjoy local cultural products; both provoke a liminal experience upon arriving at the center; both travelers

receive some meaning or self-realization from the liminal experiences. There is a pleasure generated on both journeys. But it is this phenomenon of pleasure that is the point that makes the difference between a pilgrimage and a secular pilgrimage: they are phenomenologically distinct. Separating pleasure as an independent issue from pilgrims' intentionalities is the dilemma of pilgrimage and tourism. These two different groups of travelers perceive different kinds of pleasure by different intentionalities. Pilgrims in religious pilgrimage have a consciousness of an encounter with God from which they may receive pleasure, but this pleasure is just a part of the whole pilgrimage. The faithful expression that is the encounter with God is an essential identity. On the contrary, tourists in secular pilgrimage perceive the pursuit of pleasure as a significant, predominant, even entire segment of the whole journey. As a result, we can say that there are concentric and excentric pilgrimages, and furthermore, that the former category is a constituent phenomenon in Christian (and by extension religious) pilgrimages; that the latter is the distinguishing phenomenon of secular (whether touristic or hedonistic) pilgrimages. This analysis supports the contention that, although similar in several phenomenological ways, they are fundamentally and constitutionally distinct phenomena.

The chapter sets out a phenomenological analysis of pilgrimage. Notably it demonstrates that the transcendental understanding of Christian pilgrimage helps us see that seeking out happiness through the encounter with the divine is an activity that makes Christian pilgrimage different from other types of journeys that might analogically be called 'pilgrimage.' Further, after the brief comparison with secular pilgrimage, it shows us that it is hard to justify the use of the term pilgrim in the sense that the term is applied to religious pilgrimages if one is a tourist undergoing a secular

pilgrimage or a hedonistic one. Perhaps, we do not have a better or more proper word to describe secular pilgrimage, in the language of tourism, so we secularize the word pilgrimage, use it in disguise, though properly belongs to the language of religion. This being so, and if it lies in the nature of the happiness that Christian pilgrims intend to seek out, the question arises as to whether there is a primary element that evokes pilgrims to pursue this understanding? In the next chapter, we argue that 'being at leisure' is that primary element of a pilgrim in the proper, religious sense, who aims at attaining happiness during the pilgrimage.

Chapter 3. Being at Leisure, a Primary Element of Being a Pilgrim

3.1 The Understanding of Leisure

What is leisure? Does it mean free time from not being at work? Does it merely mean recreation and relaxation? In his Politics, Aristotle claims that leisure is the first principle of all action.[192] What Aristotle meant was that 'action' pertains to an activity of the capacity of knowledge, and leisure becomes a primary element of knowing. The etymology of the word leisure derives from the Latin word licere, which means 'to be permitted'or 'to be free'.[193] Further, the English word leisure is used to translate the Greek *skole* (σχολή), or the Latin word scola descends from skole, from which the English word 'school' is derived. Therefore, the meaning of the English word school derives from a word which means leisure: an idea that might strike some students as odd! In modern society, leisure is sometimes connected with work. Being at leisure is undertaken to reboot one's energy in order to have the capacity to work the more. This understanding totally reverses the original meaning of leisure. On the contrary, leisure enables man to think and study the world and himself as a whole, because "to the Greek mind, the primary function of leisure was not necessarily recreational, but to expand one's awareness and understanding of the world."[194] While the Latin word otium means leisure, as well, the negation of otium is neg-otium, which corresponds to the English word 'business' and 'negotiate'. In Greek, ascholia descends from skole, which is the negation of leisure as well. Hence, when

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[192] Aristotle, *Politics* 1337b 32.

[193] Oxford English Dictionary, s.v. "leisure, n.," accessed May 1, 2020, https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/107171?rskey=UohYDv&result=1&isAdvanced=false.

[194] See the definition of Leisure from School Wikipedia Selection (2007) checked and changed by McGill University: https://www.cs.mcgill.ca/~rwest/wikispeedia/wpcd/wp/l/Leisure.htm, accessed March 2, 2020.

one does not have the capacity for leisure, one lives only or merely as a worker or laborer who is not free to study or to know.

The opposite of leisure is not working but idleness, in Greek acedia. Josef Pieper notes that "leisure is only possible when a man is at one with himself, when he acquiesces in his own being, whereas the essence of acedia is the refusal to acquiesce in one's own being."[195] Instead of doing nothing, like a lazy man at home, idleness is an incapacity that requires both an acquiescence of oneself in that idleness and an apprehension of reality of the world as requiring his engagement. The opposite of acedia is that state of "man's happy and cheerful affirmation of his own being"[196]: it is in this sense that leisure should be understood.

Josef Pieper identifies three qualities that give a proper explanation of leisure. Firstly, leisure is to be understood as standing against the overvaluation of the social function of work. Pieper recalls the distinction between artes liberals and artes serviles, between free and servile activities.[197] In the 'total-work' world, people would be drawn into servile and hard work because that work fulfill certain social needs. However, this trend makes even liberal art often aims at some useful purpose. Therefore, being free from useful social function is what Pieper stresses. Leisure assures the ability of a human person to step over the boundaries of the total-work world, from which over-stepping, even though one is embedded in socially useful functionality, one can achieve a good life, from one's own free disposition. Further, the point of being at leisure is not for the sake of restoring one's

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[195] Josef Pieper, *Leisure: The Basis of Culture;* The Philosophical Act (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2009), 46.
[196] Ibid., 45.
[197] Pieper, *An Anthology*, 139.

working power[198] because the function of a human being should not merely lie in a workday routine. Instead, being at leisure transcends one out of the function-oriented society and enables one to live a good life as a human being. This value of being at leisure is shown to the Christian, Pieper notes, since "As God, who made all things, did not rest in those things [that He had made], but rested in himself from the created works."[199] Resting in God is where one can find the value of human life. Therefore, leisure sets us free from servitude to daily work as an end in itself.

Secondly, leisure is set by Pieper over and against the overvaluation of hard work. Pieper, referring to the Medieval account of knowledge, drew a distinction between understanding as ratio and understanding as *intellectus*.[200] He further agrees that ratio signifies as discursive thought and *intellectus* as receptive contemplation, simply intuition.[201] Whilst the effort of discursive thought gives one an assurance of attaining knowledge, it does not mean that all knowledge requires the effort of discursive thought. In order to provide an answer that recognizes the value of intuition, Pieper claims that leisure stands as a contemplative attitude of celebration.[202] Leisure as a celebration offers the image of a joyful, grateful mind consenting to one's being and pursuing goodness with love, while hard work encourages the acceptance of difficulty in what is good. In the same way, the essence of knowledge consists in grasping, existing and unveiling reality.[203] Moreover, the virtue of knowledge is wisdom that one can know a thing without difficulty. It has been mentioned that Aristotle asserted that the supreme

[198] Pieper, *Leisure*, 49–50.

[199] Ibid., 50.

[200] Ibid., 28.

[201] Ibid., 29.

[202] Ibid., 48.

[203] Ibid., 34.

knowledge is to know the divine, thus, contemplation is the activity of knowing without hard work. To freely attain knowledge may be preceded by a great effort of thought, however, Pieper argues "the effort is not the cause; it is the condition."

Furthermore, in Pieper's analysis, the attitude of celebration enables a human being to accept the intuition of what one has as a gift. Being in celebration is to affirm the basic meaningfulness of the world, which is a receptive attitude. It is an attitude of beholding, in which one beholds, sees, and contemplatively celebrates what one already had. Therefore, a festive attitude can overcome hard work in daily life because, in celebrating, one can experience the world or oneself as receiving a gift of knowing, which is different from the everyday one. This festive attitude also corresponds to the notion of liminal experience which we have previously examined. Thirdly, for Pieper, leisure is against the overvaluation of activity. Leisure is essentially 'non-activity', a form of silence. It is primary and prior to the previous two characteristics of leisure, because to be in a state of non-activity, one's mind ought to be free from the temptation of total-work and to thinking as understood as ratio. Further, as leisure is the opposite of idleness, which means doing nothing, leisure as non-activity transcends activities in the economic world, which are related to productivity. Leisure directs that human fullness is not fulfilled in productivity. Meanwhile, being at leisure does not escape from reality but corresponds with reality at a deeper level. The dimension of a human being is beyond only the material world, and thereby, leisure enlightens one to look at life above the material world by contemplating what reality is and fundamentally who 'I am' in that reality.

Hence, from Pieper's understanding on leisure and its threefold oppositions, we see that leisure is an attitude of mind from which a human being can freely know the world and live one's own life with meaningfulness. Being at leisure does not encourage us to be an effortlessly idealistic being but sets us free from toil and exertion, even though work remains an inescapable part of our life; it turns us into whole human beings. What, then, leads us to achieve leisure?

3.2 The Connection between Happiness, Contemplation, and Leisure

Pieper notes that "leisure, like a contemplation, is of a higher order than the *vita activa*."[204] Contemplation leads us to achieve leisure. Inherently, contemplation pertains to what Aristotle calls theoria. For theoria, the contemplative study of the divine is the self-sufficient and complete activity in the pursuit of happiness, and so there is a relationship between happiness and leisure. Aristotle notes that "happiness seems to be found in leisure; for we deny ourselves leisure (*ascholein*/ un-leisurely/work) so that we can be at leisure."[205] Aristotle does not wish to undermine the value of work but insists on the awareness that there is a higher dimension of the human being than the utilitarian way, and that such a higher dimension is the contemplation (*theoria*) of happiness. Pieper identifies three elements of contemplation with which we link the notion of happiness.[206]

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[204] Ibid., 50.

[205] Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1177b 5−6.

[206] Josef Pieper, *Happiness and Contemplation* (South Bend, IN: St. Augustine's Press, 1998), 73–75.

The first is a silent perception of reality.[207] Leisure, as an attitude of non-activity, is the fountainhead of contemplation. A human person is capable of ascertaining the nature of reality by visionary knowledge: understanding as *intellectus* is intrinsically linked with contemplation. In order to contemplate something, one might have to become disinterested with regard to other objects in the active world—this is the 'silent' to which Pieper refers—and merely gaze on the thing one intends to contemplate. To attain knowledge by contemplation is to pertain to what Pieper calls silent perception of reality. Contemplation, therefore, tends to be a purely receptive approach to reality—to the existence of oneself, to the whole of the humanity and to the world. Speaking of the object that one contemplates, a human person is one who wishes to contemplate the good, the true, and the beautiful. Further, since happiness, eudaimonia, is related to the good of human life, one might desire to know what it is. The ultimate happiness, for Christians, is the *beatitudo*, the vision of God, which is the object that they would contemplate and know. Leisure provides a space of mind for one to contemplate on the reality, the self, and the Divine.

The second element of contemplation is a form of knowing by intuition.[208] To have an intuition of something is to see or perceive something present. Discursive thinking, in other words, is knowledge of what is absent, which the subject matter is not seen in itself but presented to the mind. Certain things require to use the power of reason. Whenever one fails to understand a thing by way of intuition, one uses the way of discursive thinking.[209] Moreover, truth comes from what we can perceive by our senses, even before the power of reason comes on the stage. Truth here is corresponding

[207] Ibid., 73.

[208] Pieper, *Happiness and Contemplation,* 73–74.

[209] Ibid., 74.

to the final step of the transcendental reduction that returns to and informs a changed, clearer, deeper natural attitude. Thomas Aquinas notes that "those things in which the intellective power is in full vigor, have no need for reason, for they comprehend the truth by their simple insight,"[210] in response to which Pieper comments that discursive thinking can be seen as the failure of intuition, and "reason is an imperfect form of *intellectus*."[211]

Pieper indeed refers to the contemplation of God, the ultimate happiness, the *beatitudo*, the *beatific* vision in which a human person receives as a gift. It is not something that one can fully grasp but only behold. There is no further end to achieve by discursive thinking. What one knows is what it has already presented before one's eyes. Hence, contemplating the ultimate happiness is the satiation of all human beings, an unmediated and utterly serene vision, even though it persists for no more than a second.[212] Being at leisure becomes the fountainhead of contemplation through which one can know the happiness by *intellectus*.

The third element of contemplation is knowing accompanied by amazement.[213] Since one of the qualities of leisure is a celebration, in the contemporary world, the celebration often pertains to bodily enjoyments, holidays, and other reveling entertainments. There is a specific time and space for festive celebrations. People find their festival-time-space in the days that there is no work, and it is from that festival-time-space that they seek their happiness. This phenomenon provokes the idea that being at leisure means not working.

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[210] ST, II–II, q.49, a.5

[211] Ibid., 74

[212] Pieper, *An Anthology,* 145.

[213] Pieper, *Happiness and Contemplation*, 75.

From the history of religion, however, Pieper observes that "to rest from works means that time is reserved for divine worship." Divine worship,[214] Pieper assures us that, is the root of celebration. Divine worship also concerns a festival-time-space from which one can find happiness by being at leisure. Also, divine worship is the source of the ultimate justification of leisure.[215] Without the element of divine worship, being at leisure will become merely an activity for pursuing pleasure in itself. As happiness is not identical to pleasure, what people feel amazed about in contemplation is the vision of happiness, the manifestation of the divine. It manifests as a vision that exceeds one's comprehension. Being at leisure enables us to embrace and to rest upon this amazement. For Catholic Christians, going to Mass on Sunday is an activity of a celebration of the divine. It corresponds to a contemplation of what happiness is accompanied by amazement. Believers sitting and kneeling on pews behold the ritual representation of the holy sacrifice of Jesus Christ, which is the event that makes them amazed, in the same way as one beholds the ultimate happiness, and not as a grasping but a contemplating of as celebration.

According to this analysis of the three elements of contemplation, we can see that under Pieper's construction contemplation takes place in one's innermost cell. When one is in contemplation, one is amazed by the vision of the object itself. In like manner, Pieper's understanding of the contemplation of happiness coherently fits with what Aristotle and Aquinas' understandings of both notions of happiness. Being in a state of *eudaimonia*, in the notion of Aristotle, is to live well continually in accordance with virtues. However, Aristotle does not further explain what the end of

[214] Pieper, *Leisure*, 67.

[215] Ibid., 66.

eudaimonia is. He hints a bit, as he has claimed that the supreme activity is the contemplative study of the divine. Thomas Aquinas completes (or at least develops) Aristotle's notion when he makes the distinction between *beatitudo* and *felicitas*. The former is the ultimate end of the latter: *beatitudo* is to *felicitas* what the end of *eudaimonia* in the earthly life is in the eternal. It is only in the afterlife, Aquinas says, that a human being can be fully in the vision of *beatitudo*. Contemplation is the activity by which a human person can foretaste this perfect joy. Pieper aligns contemplation and happiness into the perspective of a subjective matter. Therefore, leisure is a precondition of happiness and contemplation. Being at leisure becomes a primary element of both. So, we might finally ask, how do leisure, happiness, and contemplation weave into pilgrimage?

3.3 Weaving the notions of Happiness, Contemplation, and Leisure in Pilgrimage

In general, as the thesis of this book proposes, pilgrimage is a journey to the center from which pilgrims seek out meaning. It has been elaborated that, by the development of mass tourism, there are a variety of journeys now referred to as pilgrimages but that, phenomenologically, pilgrims have different intentionalities of journey, center, and a quest for meanings. Particularly, we have seen how Christian pilgrims seek out the meaning of happiness in Christian pilgrimage. By contemplation, Christian pilgrims receive the vision of God through which they understand what happiness is. Pilgrimage as a mediation provides the means whereby the pilgrim is enabled to enter the liminal phase. However, is pilgrim a happy man? A contemplative man?

If the pilgrim is to be identified with a happy man who knows happiness, with a contemplative man who knows contemplation, being at leisure is a primary element. Being at leisure enables a person to live in simplicity, a simplicity does not mean living a life as a monk in the cloister, rather, it makes one see what is presented before one's eyes. Further, since "man is not capable of an act continuing without interruption,"[216] being at leisure is not to say existing in a state of contemplation perpetually. Instead, one is capable of stepping away from the daily routine and into the restful moment of now. A contemplative man is happy to become disinterested towards other distracting activities and contemplates what is being presented. During a pilgrimage, pilgrims are happy to step away from their daily routine, and into the liminal phase where the center is located. Disregarding other activities, pilgrims are happy to gaze on the vantage point of the center. For Christians, it is the encounter with God that leads to happiness. Once it occurs, pilgrims are happy to contemplate it, even stay in this moment perpetually. Without the ability of being at leisure, as mentioned above, a pilgrim could not be a happy and contemplative man, and all of these phenomena are rooted in leisure and simplicity. Being at leisure allows pilgrims to see the now.

In the dimension of a life-long pilgrimage, pilgrims are on the way to know and desire to see the end. Ontologically, human life is always being on the way to somewhere else, as we saw Augustine maintain: one can go forward or backward, but no one can step out of the track of life. This, Pieper claims, is the virtue of hope understood as the *status viatoris*.[217] *Status viatoris* denotes the condition of being on the way that a human being is one who is a not-yet finished being in this world. To be *viator* is to be on

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[216] Pieper, *Happiness and Contemplation,* 101.

[217] Pieper, *Faith, Hope, Love*, 91–92.

the way toward eternal happiness.[218] A human person is an unfulfilled and incomplete being, directed towards the fulfillment of the self-realization of human's existence, which is to see the Beatific Vision. Therefore, this not-yet element of the human being signifies that human existence is always in process or on *in via* of becoming. There is a hope or desire ordered to the end of the being, the *status viatoris* ordered towards the *status comprehensoris*, the condition of being the fulfilled one. The understanding of status viatoris lets us enclose the human's natural being, that is both not-yet and becoming.

Furthermore, the pilgrimage character of the status viatoris, Pieper holds, enables us to realize that a human being is a finite being who desires to know the ultimate end. Going on a physical pilgrimage provides a chance to foresee or realize in anticipation the center of one's life. Pilgrims can turn their life from being excentric to being concentric with regards to the center understood as the contemplation of the divine. For Christian pilgrims, it is a transformation from a desire for Jerusalem to a desire for the Heavenly Jerusalem. It is precisely because being at leisure enables the pilgrim to have a foretaste of eternal happiness, a vision of what happiness is, to contemplate this vision, and to see the destination of the *status viatoris*, that it is the primary element of pilgrimage. To see as *theorein*, to contemplate is the happiest activity. To see the destination of the life-long pilgrimage is not to attain it but to hope for it. One in the condition of the hope of arriving at the destination is that signifies being in *status comprehensoris*. The pilgrimage character, however, reveals that a human being cannot be in *status comprehensoris* with an absolute certainty. Since a human person can hope, therefore, there is a happiness in life; in the same way, one can be at leisure, one can know and contemplate this happiness in earthly life. This

[218] Ibid., 92.

means that, for Pieper, the *status viatoris* is related directly to the virtue of hope, which shows us that the fulfillment of human existence is both not-yet and already. It is not-yet because a human being is always being on the way to the fulfillment of one's being. It is already because, by contemplation of eternal happiness, a human person is capable of glimpsing it now. The change from 'not being able to see' into 'able to see' implies a journey, and this journey is a pilgrimage from which one can see what the most desired thing is to see. Therefore, pilgrimage, leisure, happiness and contemplation are all intrinsically woven into the human condition as being in *status viatoris.*

Conclusion

A little sign pinned on the door of St. Catherine's church in Bethlehem says that "If you enter here as a tourist, you would exit as a pilgrim. If you enter here as a pilgrim, you would exit as a holier one." The Franciscan brothers, who are the custodians of the Holy Land, encourage tourists to become pilgrims and pilgrims to become holier persons. Since, "all men by nature desire to know,"[219] as Aristotle noted that at the beginning of the *Metaphysics*, we can conclude that the message of this sign recognizes that there is continuum running from religious to secular pilgrimage, because it is observably true that pilgrims and tourists both intend to know more, and that this is the nature of all human beings. Nevertheless, this work has shown that, despite this continuum, despite their similarities, Christian pilgrimage is phenomenologically different from secular pilgrimage.

This book has made a phenomenological comparison between both Christian pilgrimage and secular pilgrimage from which the commonalities have been identified. After considering the anthropological work of Victor and Edith Turner concerning pilgrimage and the notion of center in Eliade, it has shown how the liminal phase and center stands as vital factors in pilgrimage, which make people live in exile after the pilgrimage concluded. These ideas of the liminal phase and center are not only restricted to religious pilgrimages: other kinds of tourism and secular, even hedonistic pilgrimages can lead travelers into the liminal phase and to the center. Returning to the example given in the introduction, we conclude that the experience of going to the football stadium is, in this regard, parallel to all other religious pilgrimage experiences: first, there is a journey; second, a center – Stamford

[219] Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 980a.

Bridge, of specific significance to the football fan, absent the experience of going there his desire will never be fulfilled; third, the visionary experience that he underwent fulfills his desire; and, lastly, through that experience, he knows what he longed to know before. Religious and secular pilgrimage are parallel because both carry these three elements: journey, center, and the quest for meanings.

There are, however, differences between these two kinds of pilgrimage and they are not merely incidental or marginal. Whilst the liminal phase could happen during either kind of pilgrimage, it is experienced differently, purposed differently, the result of differing intentionalities. The phenomenon of Christian pilgrimage tells us that Christian pilgrims embark on a journey to the sacred sites and intend to have an encounter with God, to see the divine. This intention brings them to know how to live a good life and what the end of earthly life is, which is the meaning of happiness for Christians. In the same way, secular pilgrims intend to know something out of self-interest by which they might have an exaltation or an overwhelmed experience as Christian pilgrims do. Nevertheless, they are never the same experience, even if they are parallel to each other, because Christian pilgrims seek a happiness which is spiritually and eternally sustainable, while secular pilgrims are looking for happiness that is temporal and recognizably momentary: one is concentric with the center, while the other excentric.

This book has shown that, according to the understandings of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas, happiness does not equal pleasure as it is commonly understood. In Aristotle's understanding, happiness, *eudaimonia* signifies living a good life, and a good life for a human person is identified with

achieving the highest human good with virtues. Furthermore, Aristotle claims that the activity of achieving the highest human good is contemplation, *theoria*. Aquinas develops Aristotle's notion of happiness, and he points out that eternal happiness is the contemplation of God, that is the most complete end to which a human person aims. The climax of Christian pilgrimage is the encounter with God in contemplation: the pleasures are consequent upon the contemplation. It is because this pleasure derives from the foretaste of eternal happiness, which triggers no further end than itself, that it functions to remind pilgrims to continue to live a good life marked by virtues. By contrast, secular pilgrims might have pleasure from the consequences attendant upon the attainment of what they aim, but this pleasure will not last, precisely because it always aims at further ends, even in repetition. Therefore, returning to the analogy of Peter Margry, and recognizing the limits of analogies according to the principle of dissimilitude, we can say that, whilst a whiskey without alcohol may still be a whiskey-like drink, the taste might be unsatisfying, because it lacks that which makes whiskey satisfying than that one may by nature desire to drink as the better one.

A work of this length is bound to throw out further questions an further opportunities for research. Amongst the matters that might reasonably be the subject of future consideration are whether contemplation is an exclusive component of the way to pursue happiness or if it is, as Aristotle claims, an essential part of that pursuit. Moreover, in the contemporary interpretation, due to the limitation of our vocabularies, perhaps, we have no choice but borrow the religious word pilgrimage in favor of describing the phenomenon of secular pilgrimage. Might it be hoped that we discover a new word to define this phenomenon. This book has not had the opportunity

of considering whether these two lines will intersect at any point, although it remains the conviction of the author that, by the light of Divine revelation, there could be a point at which they meet.

This book has argued that by virtue of the phenomenological understanding of pilgrimage, being at leisure is a primary element for those whose aim is to know what the world, the meaning of life, happiness, and the Divine are, during those journeys that might properly be called pilgrimage. Josef Pieper recovers the understanding of leisure not just as inactivity against toil or hard work; instead, he imbues the term with the value of being a receiver and excludes the idea of leisure as being lazy, in Greek acedia, which he argues is, in fact, the opposite of leisure. Further, leisure as an attitude enables one to realize that a human being is a finite being that is always on the way to knowing. This understanding pertains to the notion of status viatoris, which signifies the similarity between pilgrimage and human life. Human beings always desire to attain more knowledge, and all knowledge contains the seeds of the contemplation of the Divine. Therefore, leisure becomes a primary element enlightening us to live a pilgrimage-like life that aims at eternal happiness. Being at leisure, status viatoris and pilgrimage are intrinsically connected because with the process of reduction: humans' happiness is grounded in the three of them.

Finally, James Schall asserts that since human beings are "aliens and exiles" (1 Peter 2:11), we ought to accept two gifts: the gift of the human's own being as a finite being, and, both simultaneously and complementarily, the gift of being open to the infinite being.[220] We can live an excellent life in

[220] James V. Schall, *Reasonable Pleasures: The Strange Coherences of Catholicism* (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2013), 199–200.

this world, but we are pilgrims toward the complete end, where the tastiest drink is located. This consideration opens up the ideas of pilgrimage, leisure, contemplation, and happiness to an exploration beyond the properly philosophical to consideration from a theological perspective.

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